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Timing the Choice of Law by Contract
By Dolly Wu ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

Contracts are a backbone of the economy. 1 Parties enter into contracts to solidify
their bargains and carry out their intentions. 2 However, subsequent unanticipated
changes in law might defeat the very purpose of a contract. “Our laws are not frozen into
immutable form, they are constantly in the process of revision in response to the needs of
a changing society.” 3 New legislation, regulations, and common law are inevitable.
However, such new law might prevent an existing contract from being executed as
intended. Familiar examples of legal changes that affect contracts include new tax plans,
local ordinances, and food and drug regulations. 4 Less familiar examples include new
patent laws, 5 remedies, 6 statutes of limitation, 7 court procedures, 8 judicial decisions
governing forum selection, 9 and adjustments to the Uniform Commercial Code. 10

∗
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1
Arguably contracts exist ubiquitously and play a central role in our economy. Even in ancient times,
contracts were important to many of the major transactions in life. See, e.g., Paul Halsall, Ancient History
Sourcebook: A Collection of Contracts from Mesopotamia, c. 2300 - 428 BCE, in INTERNET ANCIENT
HISTORY SOURCEBOOK (1999), http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/mesopotamia-contracts.html
(describing contracts for the sale of real estate, food, crops, and for rentals, leases, labor (employment),
borrowing money, and so on).
2
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 341–51 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the term “contract”).
3
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 82 (1974) (quoting Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1226
(9th Cir. 1972)).
4
See, e.g., Michael R. Taylor, FDLI Food Safety Conference: The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act:
Putting Ideas into Action, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 27, 2011),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OC/OfficeofFoods/ucm241192.htm (referring to the FDA
Food Safety Modernization Act); David M. Herszenhorn, House Set to Follow Senate in Approving Tax
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2010, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/us/politics/16cong.html (referring to an $858 billion tax plan).
5
See, e.g., infra Section II.B.
6
See, e.g., CoreBrace LLC v. Star Seismic LLC, 566 F.3d 1069 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
7
See, e.g., Chapman v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Douglas, 107 U.S. 348 (1883) (holding that a change
in statute of limitation barred suit in a contract dispute); In re Apex Express Corp., 190 F.3d 624, 642 (4th
Cir. 1999).
8
See, e.g., Goldhammer v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 248, 255 (D. Mass. 1999).
9
See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 349 (W. Va. 2009).
10
See, e.g., David Frisch, Rational Retroactivity in a Commercial Context, 58 ALA. L. REV. 765, 768
(2007) (citing changes to the U.C.C. Articles 1 (2001), 2 (2003), 2A (2003), 3 (2002), 4 (2002), 4A(1989),
5(1995), 6(1989), 7(2004), 8(1994), and 9(2001)).
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In each of these examples, legal changes might hamper contracts. For instance, the
imposition of new sales taxes on soda in certain states created an uproar because the taxes
could increase product prices, thereby decreasing demand and profits. 11 Until the taxes
expire, existing sales contracts for soda hold volume buyers hostage to lost profits,
because the contracts might not account for lost sales from the taxes. 12
This kind of scenario is prevalent in patent law and in patent licensing where courts
are constantly reinterpreting the law. Within the last three or four years, cases such as
KSR v. Teleflex, 13 Quanta v. LG, 14 In re Bilski, 15 Bilski v. Kappos, 16 CoreBrace v. Star
Seismic, 17 and Uniloc v. Microsoft 18 frustrated patent practitioners and licensors. 19 The
new decisions have the potential to cause previously-granted patents to become invalid,
or change the scope of an already-executed license 20 and thus diminish the value of the
license. Unfortunately, parties have few retroactive remedies.

11
See Janet Adamy, Soda Tax Weighed to Pay for Health Care, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2009, at A4,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124208505896608647.html; Eric Boehm, “Soda Tax” Faces
Many Opponents: Lobbyist and Unions Line Up to Fight Nutter’s Proposal, PA INDEPENDENT (Mar. 11,
2010), http://www.paindependent.com/todays_news/detail/soda-tax-faces-many-opponents.
12
The Business Council, Legislative Memo Regarding Tax on Soft Drinks, BUS. COUNCIL N.Y. STATE,
INC. (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.bcnys.org/inside/Legmemos/2009-10/s6610a9710TaxonSoftDrinks.htm.
13
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). KSR confounded patent-holders and licensors.
See Peter Lattman, KSR v. Teleflex: The Supreme Court’s Big Patent Ruling, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (May 1,
2007, 8:07 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/05/01/ksr-v-teleflex-the-supreme-courts-big-patentruling/tab/article/ (highlighting how many commentators thought that the KSR ruling might invalidate
patents and make it harder to get a patent in the future).
14
Compare Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), and Mary LaFrance,
LaFrance on Quanta Computer, Inc., v. LG Electronics, Inc., 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 2401 (2008)
(LexisNexis Group), with Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Quanta puzzled practitioners, because it expanded the concept of patent exhaustion and seemed
inconsistent with Mallinckrodt.
15
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008); John A. Squires & Duane R. Valz, Awaiting and
Anticipating Bilski, 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 4910 (2010) (LexisNexis Group).
16
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
17
Corebrace LLC v. Star Seismic LLC, 566 F.3d 1069, 1072–73 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding the phrase
“make, use and sell” implies have-made rights with regard to third parties).
18
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The 25 percent “rule of
thumb” for calculating a reasonable royalty for purposes of infringement damages “is a fundamentally
flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation,” and thus precludes its use
for damages calculations. This change has a major impact on past patent licenses that are paid-out and
recomputed over many years and also on adverse licensing negotiations. Based on the past cases using this
rule, practitioners assumed this 25% rate to set their existing licensing rate and to anticipate litigation
should anything go awry. The Court did not propose a new rule in its opinion, thus leaving much
uncertainty among the lower courts and practitioners.
19
See infra Section II.B for further explanation of the impact of these cases to patent licensing.
20
For example, even though Quanta was decided in 2008, there are already nine litigated license cases
that follow Quanta. The patent licenses in the following cases existed prior to the Quanta decision: Static
Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 577 (E.D. Ky. 2009); Cornell Univ.
v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 01-CV-1974, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60209 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2008). See
also KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (applying a looser standard than the former
TSM test, thus making it easier to invalidate already-patented inventions as being “obvious”); Lufkin v.
McCallum, 956 F.2d 1104, 1107 (11th Cir. 1992) (Regarding a revised statute of limitations, the court
stated that if a new rule of law was applied to the parties in the case in which it was announced, it was
applicable retroactively to all pending cases.). Whether a new law is applicable may depend on the filing
date of the cause of action. See, e.g., VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574,
1576 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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Like judicial decisions, new statutes and administrative regulations also take
immediate effect, or even take retroactive effect to the possible detriment of existing
private contract holders. 21 Unanticipated changes can render performance or breach of a
contract impractical or impossible. 22 Moreover, private parties to a contract are likely to
lose if they attempt to challenge new laws based on constitutional grounds under the
Contract Clause. 23 Accordingly, new laws can also adversely affect already-existing
private contracts. If parties do not draft a contract defensively enough, there may be little
they can do afterwards to salvage the situation inexpensively, if at all.
Therefore, there is a need for a proactive solution to overcome unwelcome and
unanticipated changes in law. 24 The paper proposes to give private parties an option to
include a “choice of time of law” clause in contracts to select the law existing at the time
of contract execution or at some future time. 25 Examples of such clauses include a
provision that establishes “the formation, effect, performance, and construction of
Contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of X existing as of the execution date
of Contract;” a provision that limits the “interpretation and execution of Contract to laws
then in force a year from the date of execution;” 26 or even more selective clauses, such as
“Patent License subject to Federal Circuit law existing at the time of execution of this
license.” This solution should overcome or anticipate all the possible changes regardless
of how laws evolve, which laws evolve, when they evolve, or how long courts take to
interpret a new law.
The purpose of this solution is to promote stability and predictability.27 Locking a
private contract into a particular law existing at, for example the time of a contract,
provides more certainty for parties. This allows an attorney to draft the rest of the
contract knowing the law and include workarounds to any detrimental laws. This is the
same reason choice of law provisions are already commonly used in current domestic
contracts. However, current domestic choice of law provisions are only territorial and
refer to the law of a location such as the state of incorporation. 28 Contracting parties
include these provisions in order to immunize agreements from uncertainties and to find

21

See In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 626 (3d Cir. 1999) (providing examples of the retroactive
application of various statutes, including one on the choice of law).
22
See infra Section II.A.
23
See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 416 (1983). The
Contract Clause is in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
24
Parties deal with many pitfalls even with existing laws and would face the possibility of additional
unforeseen problems with new law. See, e.g., Charles A. Weiss, A Few Problems in Licenses and How to
Avoid Them and Due Diligence License Review Checklist, INTELL. PROP. ISSUES IN BUS. TRANSACTIONS
(Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.pli.edu/emktg/toolbox/Problems_Licenses13.doc.
25
This paper does not suggest allowing parties to select any random time period such as past laws
existing, for example, in President Lincoln’s day.
26
Or more formally, what about a clause, such as “law existing as of [date X], which shall render
inapplicable for the contract any later changes in the law” or “settlement agreement shall be subject only to
governing law of [State Y] existing at the time of execution of this agreement”?
27
See, e.g., Ronald T. Coleman, Jr. & David B. Darden, The Constitutionality of Retroactive Franchise
Laws, 21 FRANCHISE L.J. 13, 14 (2001) (“Contracts Clause jurisprudence is essentially a balancing of the
need for contractual stability and predictability on the one hand and the legitimate interest of the states in
regulating to address public needs on the other.”).
28
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971) (“The world is composed of territorial
states.”).
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the most favorable law among the laws of different states. 29 Nonetheless, these
provisions do not account for variations with time. As such, this paper suggests an
extension to the existing choice of law clause to include a “choice of time of applicable
law” provision in private domestic contracts.
Enforcing an explicit choice of time of law provision in private domestic contract
should encounter few obstacles. First, some constitutional cases already hold that the
laws existing at the “time and place of contract” are grafted onto each contract. 30 Second,
choice of time of law clauses have been implemented successfully in international
contracts. 31 In the international context, these clauses are known as stabilization
clauses. 32 The practice should carry over to American contracts. To distinguish domestic
from international practices, this paper adopts the phrase “choice of time of law” rather
than “stabilization.” Third, state common law suggests that an express choice of time of
law clause would be a welcome addition to lawyers’ toolboxes. 33 Finally, the proposed
solution appears to be consistent with the Conflict of Laws rules that govern traditional
choice of law provisions. 34
A major obstacle that an express choice of time of law clause may encounter is
public policy. When there are policy arguments against the adoption of such a clause,
this paper proposes a test (“Test”) that courts may invoke in individual cases to verify
whether the clause should be accepted. The Test examines whether contracting parties
could have substituted alternative language rather than using a choice of time of law
clause to protect themselves against unanticipated negative changes in law, without
violating public policy.
Sections II.A and II.B provide further examples of the problem and explain how
new common law and legislation take effect. Section II.C proposes a proactive solution
to the problem. Section III.A discusses constitutional law and federal decisions that have
upheld a concept of “time and place of contract.” Section III.B discusses how choice of
time of law clauses are already implemented in international contracts. Section III.C
covers state contract law in relation to such a clause. Section III.D analyzes issues
related to the Conflict of Laws. Section IV describes possible public policy hurdles.
Section V counters with a Test to determine whether public policy allows enforcement of
the clause. Section VI applies this paper’s solution to a specific example; namely,
domestic patent licensing. A choice of time of law provision seems particularly

29

For example, the U.C.C. is not adopted uniformly among the states, so a choice of law provision is
particularly important for commercial contracts. See BRYAN D. HULL, INSIDE SALES AND LEASES: WHAT
MATTERS AND WHY 3 (2008) (“Articles 2 and 2A of the UCC have been adopted in some form by all of the
United States except for Louisiana. States do not necessarily enact all sections of the UCC without
change—there are a number of non-uniform provisions, the number of which varies from state to state.”).
30
See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429–30 (1934).
31
These contracts are between a private party and the foreign government. See, e.g., ANDREA
SHEMBERG, STABILIZATION CLAUSES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A RESEARCH PROJECT CONDUCTED FOR IFC
AND THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (2008), available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/p_StabilizationClausesandHumanRights/$FILE/St
abilization+Paper.pdf [hereinafter SHEMBERG].
32
Id.
33
See infra Section III.B.
34
See infra Section V.
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appropriate in patent licenses because patent law changes often and dramatically. Section
VII concludes this paper.
II. THE UNCERTAINTY OF NEW LAW AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION
¶10

Contracts come in many types. For example, there are covenants, agreements,
licenses, leases, assignments for franchises, employment, insurance, construction,
property, trusts, pre-nuptials, and banking. 35 With many contracts in so many areas, there
is a high probability that new legislation or judicial decisions can suddenly affect the
scope of some existing contract in a way not intended or foreseen by the contracting
parties. Both new judicial decisions and legislation tend to take effect immediately even
if they are enacted after private parties executed their intentions by a contract.
Alternatively, a new law that appears at first to be unrelated to a contract, such as a rule
of civil procedure, can create a tangential impact on a contract. Tangential changes can
be especially difficult for parties to anticipate. The disruption to private contracts caused
by new law motivates the need for a solution.
A. New Laws Take Effect Immediately

¶11

With respect to common law, both federal and state courts hold that it is within the
inherent power of a court to give a judicial decision prospective or retrospective
application without offending the U.S. Constitution. 36 There are different factors for
determining when procedural and non-procedural common laws are accorded prospective
or retrospective effect. 37 “If the new law imposes significant new duties and conditions
and takes away previously existing rights, then the law should be applied
As long as the judicially-revised conditions do not violate
prospectively.” 38
constitutional rights, it is a common law rule that a decision takes effect retroactively. 39
For example, in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., West Virginia changed its forum
selection rules. West Virginia courts applied the new decision to interpret forum
selection clauses to even those that existed in contracts executed and drafted before the
new law took effect. 40
¶12
The retroactive application of new legislation is treated somewhat differently from
judicial decisions. 41 Application depends on whether the party to the contract is a state or
35

See generally JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 8 (4th ed. 2001); E. Allan
Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980's: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 203
(1990) (providing some examples).
36
See, e.g., Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507 (1973); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372
(1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322 (W. Va. 2009); Great
N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932); Crowe v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86, 93 (1st
Cir. 2004) (“As a general rule, judicial decisions are retroactive in the sense that they apply both to the
parties in the case before the court and to all other parties in pending cases.”)).
37
See Robinson, 409 U.S. at 507–08, 511.
38
Lopez v. Maez, 651 P.2d 1269, 1276 (N.M. 1982).
39
Robinson, 409 U.S. at 509–10.
40
Caperton, 690 S.E.2d at 352–53.
41
Frisch, supra note 10, at 766–67. There seem to be conflicting decisions regarding whether
retroactive application of legislation is permitted and under what circumstances. See, e.g., Robert C.
Feldmeier, The Illinois Supreme Court’s Latest Last Word on Statutory Retroactivity, 92 ILL. B.J. 260 (May
2004); James L. Huffman, Retroactivity, the Rule of Law, and the Constitution, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1095
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a private entity. 42 Unless a state is a contracting party, courts apply rational-basis
scrutiny and defer to legislative judgment as to the reasonableness of new legislation. 43
The Supreme Court has construed the Contract Clause such that it “does not prohibit the
States from repealing or amending statutes generally, or from enacting legislation with
retroactive effects.” 44 In fact, new legislation will sometimes contain an express
provision allowing retroactive application. 45 When there is no clear legislative intent and
the parties' vested rights are not harmed or the statute is deemed to be procedural, courts
may then apply the statute retroactively. 46 For instance, where an amendment to an oil
and gas corporate income tax did not create a harsh or unfair result for the affected
parties, the amendment was held to operate retroactively.47 Likewise, when the patent
statutes extended the term of a patent from seventeen to twenty years, a patent licensee
was expected to pay for the extra three years. 48 The rule also applies to administrative
regulations that encompass a large body of law. 49
¶13
As a result, private contracting parties can encounter the consequences of changes
from legislation, judicial decisions, or administrative law overriding the parties’ intent as
expressed in their original contract. 50 Worse still, this can cause breach of contract and
lead to expensive litigation, such as over a hotel sales contract, 51 a capital management
agreement, 52 or an agreement to purchase excess electricity. 53
B. Examples of Legal Changes that Affect a Contract
¶14

There are two categories of legal changes that may affect a contract. One category
is related to contract law generally and the second category is related to other areas of law

(2000) (noting that Supreme Court justices cannot agree as to retroactivity). Regardless, there is case law
where statutes have been applied retroactively.
42
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 505–06 (1987).
43
Id.
44
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 (1977)
(emphasis added).
45
In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 626 (3d Cir. 1999) (providing an example allowing the retroactive
application of 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) related to the choice of law provision).
46
United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 17; Boyd Rosene & Assocs., Inc. v. Kansas Mun. Gas Agency,
174 F.3d 1115, 1120–21 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 275 (1994)).
47
Atl. Richfield Co. v. State, 705 P.2d 418, 424 n.17 (Alaska 1985). It is arguable whether the oil
companies were happy with the retroactive application of additional taxes levied by the amended
administrative statute.
48
BJM, Inc. v. Melport Corp., 18 F. Supp. 2d 704, 705–07 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (The agreement stated that
royalty payments to BJM “shall continue until the last of the patents expires.” Then, the patent laws
changed, extending the life of a patent.).
49
See, e.g., Rehart v. Clark, 448 F.2d 170, 173 (9th Cir. 1971).
50
Both varieties, new legislation and judicial decisions, are referred to as “new law” in this paper.
51
Landis v. Hodgson, 706 P.2d 1363, 1368–69 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (reasoning that if government
imposition of a new law was an event, the nonoccurrence of which was assumed at the time of the contract,
the performing party would be excused from the duty to perform).
52
Admiral Fin. Corp. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that Admiral
could not recover damages from the U.S. based on the enactment of the statute, as Admiral “assumed the
risk of a regulatory change” and was not injured by the change).
53
BP Chems., Inc. v. AEP Texas Cent. Co., 198 S.W.3d 449, 457 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the
electrical generating facility’s failure to comply with new legislation that required it to register with the
state's electric production and transmission grid rendered it impossible or commercially impracticable for
the utility to either capture or resell the electricity).
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that only impinge on particular elements specific to that contract. In the second category,
a new law seemingly related to a legal issue other than contracts may later turn out to
impact the contract. The distinction is important because different areas of law change
more rapidly than others. Parties may wish to overcome disruptions from only the
rapidly-changing areas of law or only one particular area of law; this can be done by
proper drafting of a choice of time of law clause to refer only to “patent law” or “food
and drug regulation.”
¶15
In the first category, for example, sales contract law and patent law have recently
experienced wide-ranging changes that affect parties to contracts. There was a major
revision to U.C.C. Article 2 in 2003, which the states could choose to adopt and that
would affect many sales contracts. 54 In particular, the Bi-Economy Market, Inc. v.
Harleysville Ins. Co. of New York decision appeared to signal a shift in New York
contract law towards litigation avenues and revised rules for consequential damages. 55
Sixteen cases have already followed some aspects of the decision in Bi-Economy. 56
There are also new laws targeted at contracts for intellectual property, e.g., patent
licenses. In 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (“CAFC”) TransCore,
LP v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp. decision created implied license obligations
that disregarded express statements in the contract. 57 The CAFC also held that
unconditional covenants-not-to-sue authorize sales to third parties by the licensee for
purposes of patent exhaustion. 58 The third party in TransCore happened to be a
competitor of the licensor. 59 Thus, had the licensor anticipated the TransCore decision,
he may have drafted the agreement with an anti-competitor clause. Also in 2009, in
CoreBrace LLC v. Star Seismic LLC, 60 the CAFC expanded the meaning of the “make,
use, sell” phrase to include implied have-made rights, which revises the scope of existing
licenses that do not happen to have language expressing any contrary intent. 61 Like KSR
54

HULL, supra note 29, at 3.
New York’s highest Court did not recognize independent tort causes of action for an insurer’s alleged
failure to perform its contractual obligation under an insurance contract. The First Department’s decision
in Acquista v. New York Life Ins. Co., 285 A.D.2d 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), was not followed by New
York Courts until the Court of Appeals’ rulings in Panasia Estates, Inc. v. Hudson Ins. Co., 886 N.E.2d
135 (N.Y. 2008), and Bi-Economy Market, Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of New York, 886 N.E.2d 127 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2008), on February 19, 2008. See Mark B. Seiger & Jeffrey L. Kingsley, Seiger and Kingsley
On Panasia Estates and Bi-Economy Market, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 2150 (2009) (LexisNexis). See also,
Recent Case: Contract Law-Consequential Damages-New York Court of Appeals Holds that Insurers May
Be Liable for Consequential Damages, 122 HARV. L. REV. 998 (2009) (citing Bi-Economy Market). These
new rules could have great consequences for insurance contracts because existing contracts were drafted
with a particular liability calculation and payout model, not accounting for the additional litigation costs
that could reduce profit margins for the insurance companies or even make them insolvent if a company is
small and there is a major catastrophe.
56
According to the LexisNexis Shepard’s report for Bi-Economy Market that was accessed on January
30, 2011, thirteen cases followed, eight distinguished, and three were neutral to Bi-Economy Market.
57
TransCore, LP v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2009). See
also, Ian A. Feinberg & Joseph A. Mahoney, US Federal Circuit Decision Affects Law of Patent
Exhaustion, Licensing and Covenants Not to Sue, THE MAYER BROWN PRACTICES (April 13, 2009),
http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=6476&nid=6.
58
TransCore, 563 F.3d at 1274.
59
US Court Rejects TransCore Complaint Against ETC on Open Road Tolling, TOLLROADNEWS (May
23, 2008, 1:56 PM), http://www.tollroadsnews.com/node/3554.
60
CoreBrace LLC v. Star Seismic LLC, 566 F.3d 1069 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
61
Lawrence M. Sung, Lawrence Sung on What Your Licensed Patent Rights Include: CoreBrace LLC v.
Star Seismic LLC, 2009 EMERGING ISSUES 4545 (2009) (Lexis Nexis).
55
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Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc. and Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., these cases
become immediate precedent. Accordingly, patent licensors would benefit from a
solution that can immunize them from potentially drastic changes in law. 62
¶16
A second category of changes, namely new laws not related to contract law, could
also affect the provisions in a particular contract. For example, in 2007, the Supreme
Court’s KSR decision eliminated Federal Circuit’s exclusive use of the so-called TSM
(teaching, suggestion, motivation) test for gauging whether an alleged invention is so
obvious as not to be inventive. 63 The Court invoked a new test of using “common sense”
to determine whether an alleged invention is an obvious combination of existing objects
and methods. 64 In the first year after KSR, there was a six-fold increase in the number of
court decisions invalidating patent claims based on the new standard of obviousness. 65
Although the new test was not contract law, it tended to extinguish existing contracts.
Likewise in 2008, the en banc CAFC in In re Bilski revised the test to determine whether
method claims in patents constitute patent-eligible statutory matter. 66 Applying the
machine-or-transformation test from Bilski, a New York court backed by scientists
invalidated an exclusive licensee’s gene patent that would diminish pharmaceutical
licenses. 67 Big software companies like Microsoft opposed the CAFC’s decision. 68 In
2010, the Supreme Court limited the role of the machine-or-transformation test, which
potentially revives patents that were invalidated under the previous CAFC decision, and
their corresponding licenses. 69 As a final example, the Patent Reform Bill is winding its
way through Congress, and includes many amendments, such as the controversial
inventorship and patent-infringement damages provisions. 70 In sum, these recent judicial

62

RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND OTHER INFORMATION ASSETS 1
(2d ed. 2007).
63
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
64
Id. at 420 (“Common sense teaches, however, that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their
primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple
patents together like pieces of a puzzle.”).
65
This six-fold increase in the number of court decisions invalidating patent claims is compared to the
year before KSR was decided. Nicholas G. Papastavros & Maia H. Harris, Do Predictions Come True?
KSR, eBay, and the Real Impact on Patent License Negotiations, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, July 2008, at 1
[hereinafter Papstavros]. The article stated that 38% of cases before a group of patent courts had a finding
of obviousness invalidating at least one patent claim after KSR versus 6% of cases before the same group of
patent courts before KSR; that is approximately a six-fold increase. As an actual example, a court denied
an injunction in Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. because the exclusive license is likely to be
worthless where the previously-valid patent is probably now invalid under KSR. 566 F.3d 999, 1002 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (exclusive licensee attempted to sue Teva et al. for patent infringement, but with the licensed
patent invalid under the new KSR standard, the value of the license is diminished).
66
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 964–65 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that business methods are not statutory
matter, the Court provided dicta that software patents are not statutory matter either, unless the business
algorithm and software claims recite sufficient machinery or physical transformation).
67
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
68
E.g., Roy Schestowitz, Why In re Bilski Can Wipe Microsoft off the Map, TECHRIGHTS (May 10,
2010, 9:19 AM), http://techrights.org/2010/05/10/bilski-vs-msft/.
69
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
70
Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Act of 2009, PATENTLYO (Mar. 3, 2009, 2:58 PM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/patent-reform-act-of-2009.html. A similar Patent Reform Act
(Bill) was started in 2007 but was not successful. There is now a Patent Reform Act of 2011. See, e.g.,
Andrew Ramonas, Senate Judiciary Panel Leaders to Introduce Patent Reform Bill, MAIN JUSTICE (Jan.
21, 2011, 12:56 PM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2011/01/21/senate-judiciary-panel-leaders-to-introducepatent-reform-bill/.
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decisions immediately took effect and invalidated existing patents. 71 Likewise, the new
Patent Reform Act is also expected to have immediate consequences. As a result,
existing licenses for already granted patents may be in jeopardy if a licensor failed to
anticipate the changes when drafting the contract. 72
¶17
Aside from patent law, food goods in a sales contract are also illustrative of the
second category of changes. There are often revisions to food laws (e.g. laws governing
the handling, inspection, delivery, etc. of food), or to tax laws that affect the price of the
food goods. 73 Manufacturers follow the revised laws that are implemented after the
execution of their contracts, whether or not they welcome the new law. 74
¶18
As the examples show, the variety of changes sufficiently divergent that parties
would be hard pressed to come up with a protective provision for each scenario without
increasing their contract to an unwieldy length. Moreover, legal changes create concerns
for many years. 75 A law can remain uncertain until courts slowly interpret and apply it to
cases. 76 Instead of a long, nervous wait, companies and practitioners could renegotiate
their existing contracts. But renegotiation can be expensive and leave the parties
uncertain as to appropriate salutary contract language. Alternatively, parties can try to
fight the new law reactively and argue frustration of purpose of the contract. 77 There is
even a suggestive “solution” in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts tailored to the
impracticality of performance due to intervening law. 78 But litigation to overcome a new
law is expensive and even more uncertain than renegotiating the private contract.79 As
such, it would be opportune if the original agreements could be proactively drafted with
some provisions that could immunize the parties from the vagaries of any new law.
71
After KSR, the first four cases heard by the Federal Circuit regarding “obvious” inventions in essence
killed the patent. See Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patentability Standards: Early Federal Circuit
Response to the Supreme Court's 2007 KSR International Decision, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 477 (2007)
(LexisNexis Group). As for Bilski, see Lawrence M. Sung, Sung on Patent Eligible Medical Technology
Post-Bilski: Prometheus Labs., Inc., 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 4810 (2010) (LexisNexis Group) (“Perhaps
the most significant patent law case to be heard in 2009 was Bilski v. Kappos. . . . While much public
attention had focused on the implications for financial services and computer software companies . . . there
were broad implications for the patenting of all technologies.”); Eric Bensen, Bensen on the Federal
Circuit’s Landmark Decision Regarding the Patent Eligibility of Process Claims Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: In
re Bilski, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 3063 (2008) (LexisNexis).
72
E.g. Bilski, 129 S. Ct. at 3231. Software cases adjudicated in the year before this decision were prone
to be invalidated, and it is unclear as to how courts will decide.
73
See generally Laws and Regulations, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?navid=LAWS_REGS&navtype=SU (last visited
April 18, 2011).
74
E.g., Interview with Susan Chao, in-house senior counsel at Frito-Lay (March 2, 1010).
75
Even three years after KSR, practitioners still consider the obviousness test to be an “emerging issue”
and generated no less than seven expert commentaries on LexisNexis and at least 330 law review articles,
according to the Shepard’s report for KSR Int’l Co., v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398.
76
See id.
77
See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
78
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 264 (“If the performance of a duty is made impracticable
by having to comply with a domestic or foreign governmental regulation or order, that regulation or order
is an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.”).
79
The respondents in Winstar hired very large, expensive law firms, arguing frustration of purpose. See
generally Brief for Trinity Ventures, Ltd. & Castle Harlan, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
United States v Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (No. 95-865), 1996 WL 143638 (Could financial
institutions that acquired insolvent thrifts be awarded rescission and restitution under frustration of purpose
doctrine upon enactment of FIRREA, which eliminated special accounting treatment for those acquisitions?
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, § 5, 12 U.S.C. § 1464).
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C. Choosing the Time of Applicable Law
¶19

This paper proposes that it should be possible for parties to include a clause in
private domestic contracts to choose the time of the applicable law and to limit the
interpretation and execution of the contract to some law existing as of a particular date,
for example, the date of execution of the contract. A riskier but related technique would
be to choose some future law. For instance, wills occasionally refer to future laws: “the
Trust Fund shall be distributed to my then surviving heirs, according to the laws of
descent and distribution then in force in Kentucky.” 80 But because of the uncertainty of
the outcome in legislative votes or court decisions in the United States, contracting
parties should probably not select future laws to apply to their contracts. 81 Because
results are more predictable for contracting parties who choose known laws, this paper
recommends selecting laws already existing at the time of contract. There are many
possible variations within such a choice, as explained in Section III-C. To clarify, this
paper does not propose that parties may randomly choose laws from any time period that
they desire. This would likely violate public interest and governmental sovereignty. If
nothing else, such a choice would be overly burdensome on the adjudication process.
¶20
There are already hints that the public would welcome the option of choosing the
time of law by contract as a means of reducing risk. For example, apartment renters have
“rent stabilization” clauses in their leases to keep the rent the same over a period of
time. 82 There are also contracts that stabilize the prices of goods, like electricity or
gasoline, by keeping the price fixed over a certain time period. 83 There are also
stabilization provisions to maintain the price of securities. 84 However, in these examples,
the contracts only attempt to freeze prices and other commercial terms, but they do not
have a clause to choose the time of the applicable laws that affect or govern the prices.
Thus, should any new laws arise, the contract would likely be affected by them. 85 This
paper explores the feasibility of an explicit choice of time of law clause that can address
the problems and act consistently with American jurisprudence.

80

Minary v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co., 419 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967) (emphasis
added).
81
JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 106 (8th ed.
2009).
82
See Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. New York State Div. of Hous. and Cmty. Renewal, 83 F.3d 45,
48 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that rent stabilization law does not constitute either physical or regulatory
taking); Adamson Cos. v. City of Malibu, 854 F. Supp. 1476, 1501–02 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (concluding that
city's mobile home rent control ordinance was substantially related to a legitimate interest).
83
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 728 F.2d 1477, 1479–80 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 547 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); Naph-Sol Ref. Co. v. Murphy Oil
Corp., 550 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Mich. 1982); Appeal of Pennichuck Water Works, 419 A.2d 1080 (N.H.
1980). For electricity, TXU Energy offers contractual plans where the rate of electricity remains the same
for twelve months regardless of fluctuations due to usage, weather conditions, cost of production, etc. The
author is on a TXU plan called “TXU Energy Texas Choice 12.”
84
See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (“Stabilization provisions
have become commonplace pursuant to statutory provisions and administrative regulations and
interpretations relating to their use. While the authority to stabilize is generally given, it is only in
relatively few cases that the authority has been exercised.”).
85
See, e.g., United Ref. Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 585 F. Supp. 626, 627 (W.D. Pa. 1984). The appellate
court's holding that the FEA had good cause to invoke emergency rulemaking procedures implicitly
recognizes that the substance of the regulation was within the agency's power vis-à-vis existing legislation.
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III. FACTORS THAT WEIGH IN FAVOR OF A CHOICE OF TIME OF LAW CLAUSE
A. Constitutional Law Related to the Time of Contracting
¶21

American constitutional jurisprudence suggests that there is a basis for enforcing an
explicit choice of time of law in domestic contracts based on the Contract Clause. The
Contract Clause states, “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts. . . .” 86 The statement is significant for contracts because contracts are
governed primarily by state law rather than federal law. 87 Although the Clause is silent
about the retroactive application of new laws to contracts a prohibition against retroactive
application of new law may be implied 88 by the Founders when they initially drafted the
clause. 89 Notably, the Contract Clause is placed next to the Ex Post Facto clause, which
has caused some courts to argue that the prohibition against the application of Ex Post
Facto laws also applies to civil matters such as contracts. 90 Indeed, some delegates to the
Constitutional Convention believed that it should. Both clauses relate to due process
issues: the lack of fair notice when new laws are applied retroactively and impair
contractual intentions or deemed-criminal acts. 91
¶22
However, the fact remains that private contracts have suffered under the vagaries of
new law. One reason is that the Court has not settled on a framework or standard of
review for analyzing Contract Clause issues in the same way as it has for other
constitutional issues like substantive due process. 92 For private contracts, the Court has
tended to apply a rational basis review of a new law. 93 Also, the importance and
interpretation of the Contract Clause has varied widely over the years. Some Supreme
Court decisions have even refuted the plain meaning of the Clause and actually impaired
existing private contracts. 94
¶23
Initially, contract rights and the Contract Clause were prominent in American
history and jurisprudence. 95 In the early 1800s, in cases like Sturges, the Supreme Court
seemingly followed the literal meaning of the Contract Clause of the Constitution,
prohibiting the application of new state laws when they impaired the obligation of a
previously-entered-into private contract. 96 Additionally, the Court defined “contract” and
86

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, 1-1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.21 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 2009).
88
E-mail from Joseph Thai, Constitutional Law Professor at Univ. of Okla. and former judicial clerk to
two U.S. Supreme Court Justices, to author (June 13, 2010, 7:35 PM CST) (on file with author).
89
Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 HARV. L. REV. 542, 547 (2009).
90
Id. at 547 n.20; Town of Cheney's Grove v. VanScoyoc, 191 N.E. 289, 290 (Ill. 1934) (referring to
both the U.S. and the Illinois constitution). Other state constitutions also prohibit ex post facto laws that
impair existing contracts. See, e.g., United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Autrey, 723 So. 2d 617, 624 (Ala. 1998)
(“A retroactive change in [the code] would impair the obligations of the plaintiffs' contracts, in violation of
. . . the Constitution of Alabama of 1901. . . .”).
91
Textualism as Fair Notice, supra note 89, at 547 n.20.
92
Thai, supra note 88.
93
Id. (referring to Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 418 (1983)).
94
See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 502 (1987) (“Unlike other
provisions in the section, it is well settled that the prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts
is not to be read literally.”) (citing W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934)).
95
United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1977).
96
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 208 (1819) (“It is the opinion of the court, that the act of the
State of New York, which is pleaded by the defendant in this cause, so far as it attempts to discharge this
defendant from the debt in the declaration mentioned, is contrary to the constitution of the United States,
87
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“impair,” stating that “[a]ny law which releases a part of this [agreement to do
something], must, in the literal sense of the word, impair it.” 97
¶24
The role and sanctity of contracts was of paramount importance until the Lochner
laissez-faire era ended. 98 Then, the Contract Clause took on different meanings such as:
(1) impairment must be substantial 99 and (2) the powers of the states to create new laws
affecting contracts are not limited, except with respect to the imposition of punishment.100
In cases like West Coast Hotel, the Supreme Court demoted the “freedom” of contract to
a “liberty.” 101
¶25
Subsequently, there were instances where constitutional law was interpreted in a
way so as to justify the concept of a choice of time of law clause. The following
paragraphs focus on such case law in recent history.
¶26
The Court returned to a more favorable interpretation of the Contract Clause, at
least with respect to contracts where a state is a party. 102 The Supreme Court concluded:
Whether or not the protection of contract rights comports with current views of
wise public policy, the Contract Clause remains part of our written Constitution.
We therefore must attempt to apply that constitutional provision . . . . 103 At the
time the Constitution was adopted, and for nearly a century thereafter, the
Contract Clause was one of the few express limitations on state power. The
many decisions of the Court involving the Contract Clause are evidence of its
important place in our constitutional jurisprudence. 104

For example, in United States Trust, despite public policy concerns, the Court required a
state to uphold the terms of its original contractual obligations based on the freedom and
intent of contract. 105 Arguably, if contractual obligations were considered to be of great

and that the plea is no bar to the action.”). Chief Justice Marshall drafted the opinion using his rather
convoluted style of argument.
97
Id. at 197–98 (“A contract is an agreement in which a party undertakes to do, or not to do, a particular
thing. The law binds him to perform his undertaking, and this is, of course, the obligation of his contract.
In the case at bar, the defendant has given his promissory note to pay the plaintiff a sum of money, on or
before a certain day. The contract binds him to pay that money on that day; and this is its obligation. Any
law which releases a part of this obligation, must, in the literal sense of the word, impair it. Much more
must a law impair it, which makes it totally invalid, and entirely discharges it.”).
98
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 641–
42 (1819) (“Contracts, the parties to which have a vested beneficial interest, and those only, it has been
said, are the objects about which the constitution is solicitous, and to which its protection is extended.”);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810); Gregory S. Alexander, The Limits of Freedom of Contract in the Age
of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 103, 103 (F. H.
Buckley ed., 1999).
99
There must be substantial impairment. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992).
100
United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 17 n.13 (citing Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 322–26
(1866); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1798)).
101
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“The Constitution does not speak of
freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
In prohibiting that deprivation the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty.”);
Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 578 (2009).
102
Alexander, supra note 98, at 103.
103
United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 16.
104
Id. at 14–15.
105
Id. at 16. The Court was motivated partly by the unfairness to the bondholders who were powerless
against the state that issued the bonds and changed the laws. Id. at 29 n.27. When fairness issues come
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importance again and parties elected to implement a choice of time of law provision in
their agreement, it should be more likely to be enforced.
¶27
Alternatively, another perspective is that the Supreme Court adopted language in
some of its modern decisions that is particularly relevant to a choice of time of law
clause:
The obligation of a contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their
agreement. This Court has said that ”the laws which subsist at the time and place
of the making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form a
part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms. This
principle embraces alike those which affect its validity, construction, discharge
and enforcement. Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the means
of enforcement. The ideas of validity and remedy are inseparable, and both are
parts of the obligation, which is guaranteed by the Constitution against
invasion.” 106

A contract includes not only its express terms but also the contemporaneous state law
pertaining to interpretation and enforcement as if they were expressly referred to or
incorporated by its terms. 107 “This principle presumes that contracting parties adopt[ed]
the terms of their bargain in reliance on the law in effect at the time the agreement [was]
reached.” 108 Although the cases relate mostly to contracts where the state government is
a party, the Court’s statements about the law-at-the-time rule seemingly can be applied to
both private and public contracts. 109 Moreover, lower federal courts have also

into play because a governmental party altered or even rescinded its own obligations retroactively, a court
will apply heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., S. California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889
(9th Cir. 2003); Sanitation & Recycling Indus. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 992–93 (2d Cir. 1997).
106
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429–30 (1934) (citing Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 197 (1819), and quoting Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 550,
552 (1866)) (emphasis added). The Court almost appeared to be wringing its hands, trying to rationalize
why they veered away from the usual rule (quoted) for contracts. It presented some distinction between the
obligation of the contract and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obligation. However,
courts sometimes no longer make this distinction regarding contracts. See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379
U.S. 497, 508 n.9 (1965). However, the distinction could still be useful, especially for patent licenses
where the remedies are sometimes bifurcated from other patent issues. Any choice of law and choice of
time provision may be refined so that one set of laws are selected for the obligation portion of the contract
and another set of laws for the remedy.
107
United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 19 n.17.
108
Id. (emphasis added) (preventing bondholders from losing the value in their bonds when the state
itself repealed its past law and did away with its contractual obligation to secure the bonds with a minimum
amount of reserve funds).
109
El Paso, 379 U.S. at 508 (referring to all contracts and not just governmental contracts). The
Supreme Court refers to the laws at the time in several decisions related to contracts. For example, in 1941,
in Wood, the Supreme Court stated that “laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a
contract . . . enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its
terms.” Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 370 (1941). The Court decided that Arkansas Act 264, repealing
Act 142 that forgave property taxes effectively voided the state’s contracts with a seller, contracts which
were made during the existence of Act 142. Id. at 371. The Court held the state violated the Contract
Clause and the obligations under the original Act 142 must apply. Id. Later, in 1977, the Court again
alluded to the concept of laws at the time of contract in order to prevent bondholders from losing the value
in their bonds when the state itself repealed its past law and did away with its contractual obligation to
secure the bonds with a minimum amount of reserve funds. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 18–19, 32.
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occasionally applied the law-at-the-time rule to purely private contracts. 110 The federal
courts balance contract rights against public policy, emergency circumstances, and
equitable principles. 111 Even when a decision goes against contract rights in the
balancing act, the decisions often mention the law-at-the-time rule. 112 As such, one might
conclude from the decisions and the rule that parties could adopt a choice of time of law
clause in their contracts and enforce it.
¶28
It is more common for courts to sua sponte assert a prior law—one existing at the
time of contract formation such as stated in United States Trust—but at least one
Supreme Court case referenced future regulations. Mastrobuono v. Shearson was a
private contract case where the Court was implicitly receptive to a choice of time of
law. 113 The Court gave effect to contract language where the parties chose future finance
semi-administrative regulations to govern an agreement between plaintiff investor and
defendant stock-brokerage firms. 114
The language in question was: “Unless
unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or relating to
[my] accounts, . . . shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules then in
effect . . . as I may elect.” 115 (emphasis added). The Court decided, “The arbitral award
110

For example, in a private contract case, the Third Circuit permitted the defendant Hess Oil to revert
to a prior law existing at the time of contract to continue relying on an old doctrine known as “borrowed
employees” that applies to contract workers. Nieves v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 819 F.2d 1237, 1253
(3d Cir. 1987). The lawsuit was already pending in court when new legislation eliminating the doctrine
was enacted. Id. There was a retroactive-application provision of the new statute, stating the new law was
to apply even to the suits that had already been filed under the old law for four of the contract employees.
Id. at 1250. The Third Circuit held the alleged public purposes of the retroactive application provision and
the means chosen to accomplish them violated the Contract Clause. Id. at 1252. The old doctrine of
“borrowed employees” thus continued to apply to the workers who were contracted under the old doctrine.
See also Ocean View Towers Assocs. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 169, 176 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (regarding
rent contracts, the court stated, “contracting parties are nonetheless ‘presumed to be aware of applicable
statutes and to intend to incorporate them.’”); Dart Advantage Warehousing, Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed.
Cl. 694, 700 (2002) (regarding warehouse space contracts with the U.S. Postal Service, the court stated,
“parties are presumed to be aware of applicable statutes and intend to incorporate them” into the contract
together with rules and regulations which are considered to be contemporaneous circumstances.); Puerto
Rico Dep't of Labor & Human Res. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 24 (Fed. Cl. 2001) (interpreting a
settlement agreement); Shell Oil Co. v. M/T Gilda, 790 F.2d 1209, 1212 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) (“This Bill of
Lading shall have effect subject to the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts of the United
States, approved April 16, 1936 . . . .”); Markwell's Estate v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 112 F.2d 253,
254 (7th Cir. 1940) (regarding taxes and a contract between divorced spouses).
111
American courts are also courts of equity. THE GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW: EVERYONE’S LEGAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA 370 (1984) (federal courts were empowered to sit either in equity or at law until 1938 when
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure established one system for processing both law and equity cases, and
all actions became “civil” actions.).
112
Compare Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448 (1934) (suspending private
contract obligations because of hardships during the Great Depression), with United States Trust Co., 431
U.S. at 21 (upholding contract rights).
113
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59 (1995).
114
Id. at 58 n.2. The rules refer to semi-administrative law, the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure.
115
Id. (“This agreement shall inure to the benefit of your [Shearson's] successors and assigns[,] shall be
binding on the undersigned, my [petitioners'] heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, and shall be
governed by the laws of the State of New York. Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any
controversy arising out of or relating to [my] accounts, to transactions with you, your officers, directors,
agents and/or employees for me or to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in
accordance with the rules then in effect, of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the
Boards of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or the American Stock Exchange Inc. as I
may elect.”) (emphasis added). In 2007, the NASD merged with the New York Stock Exchange's
regulation committee to form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, or FINRA. See Securities
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should have been enforced as within the scope of the contract.” 116 Thus, this precedent
implicitly condones a contractual choice of time of law in private contracts.
¶29
Finally, it is important to note that when the courts refer to the “laws at the time,”
they refer to all areas of law that may affect a particular contract and not merely contract
law—i.e., it may be food regulations, patent law, procedural rules, or any matter that is
related to the subject of the contract. In fact, the Supreme Court described this scenario
in a case dealing with to appellate-procedure rules, finding that the appellate-procedure
rules impacted a contract and were thus subject to the laws at the time of contract rule.117
As such, parties considering a choice of time of law clause should consider all types of
laws and strategically select only certain sets of laws under the choice of time of law
provision. 118
¶30
In sum, the federal courts have held that laws existing at the time a contract is
formed and where the contract is performed are treated as if they were expressly
incorporated in the contract. 119 A logical extension of these decisions is that a choice of
time of law provision may actually be expressly drafted into a contract, where the parties’
intent is to enforce the contract under then-existing law or even future law.
B. Compatibility with State Contract Law
¶31

Although federal courts adopted the concept that “the laws which subsist at the
time . . . [are] as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated,” 120 a bigger concern is
whether state courts would enforce a choice of time of law clause in a contract because
contracts are generally governed by state law. For one thing, states do not have uniform
laws. Also, some states apparently do not adhere to the federal concept in contract
cases. 121 Consequently, it is even more important for parties to include an express
provision because contracts largely governed by state law. Such a provision may well
deter a court’s attempt to defeat the party’s original choice. Fortunately, state contract
law, like federal constitutional law, contains a basis for adopting and enforcing an
express choice of time of law clause.
¶32
U.S. contract law comes primarily from state common law (represented by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts) and state statutory law (modeled after the Uniform

Regulations Advice for the Individual Investor, SEC, NASD, AND SECURITIES LAW INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.sec-nasd-regulations.com/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
116
Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 64.
117
In Digital Equipment, a petitioner tried to appeal a lower court’s decision related to a private
contract. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 876–77 (1994). The Court concluded
the particular order is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id. When the petitioner argued that section
1291 should be ignored because the petitioner held an express right by contract not to be subjected to trial
by the other party, the Court pointed out, “[T]he laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a
contract . . . enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to . . . in its terms.” Id. at 876
n.5 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429–30). That is, section 1291 existed
even at the time of contract and it did not allow an appeal of the order.
118
This is a technique already practiced in international contracts where parties attempt to avoid the
most-rapidly changing or disadvantageous laws. See infra Section III.C.
119
United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. N.J., 431 U.S. 1, 19, n. 17 (1977) (citing Home Bldg., 290 U.S. at
429–30 (quoting Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 550 (1867))).
120
Home Bldg., 290 U.S. at 430–31. See discussion supra note 106.
121
See examples supra Introduction and Section II.
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Commercial Code). 122 Although specialized law governs some types of contracts, 123
there are fundamental principles that are common to most types of contracts. 124 For
example, freedom to contract is fundamental to all contracts, including sale of goods
contracts and patent licenses. 125 Due partly to shared fundamental principles, it is
possible to demonstrate the general applicability of the proposed solution. This paper
examines the feasibility of the choice of time of law concept for both goods and
patents. 126 The same concepts should be extendable even to other types of contracts.
Sale of goods contracts are governed by the U.C.C. Art. 2 (“UCC2”). 127 Patent licenses,
on the other hand, are governed by traditional common law because patents are not
“goods.” 128 Also, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts theoretically provides a
reasonable basis for patent license law. 129
¶33
The two laws, UCC2 and the Restatement, presumably share some common
fundamental principles. They were both drafted partly by the same group, but the UCC2
tends to favor legislation while the Restatement tends to favor common law. 130 The most
122

U.C.C. § 1-103 (2009) (Official Comment 3); CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 87, at § 1.21.
JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., 1-1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS DESK EDITION § 1.01 (2009).
124
U.C.C. art. 2; JOHN E. MURRAY, 1-1 MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 8 (4th ed. 2001) (“Sources and
Theories–Classical, Neoclassical et al.”); CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 87, at § 1.21 (“There are
legal questions common to all of these transactions,” but that “[t]here are also questions unique to each
kind of transaction, the business context of maritime charters requires that special rules should apply that
do not apply to a contract for sale of a house”).
125
See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 87, § 1.1 (“The Main Purpose of Contract Law Is the
Realization of Reasonable Expectations Induced by Promises”); infra note 126.
126
Patent licenses are peculiar because not only are patents not “goods,” they are anti-goods. They
provide a limited right to exclude someone from making the goods, the patented invention; they do not
provide a right to make the goods. Compare Lamle v. Mattel, Inc., 394 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(citing Novamedix, Ltd. v. NDM Acquisition Corp., 166 F.3d 1177, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1999)), and 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(1), and Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852) (emphasis added), and TransCore, LP v.
Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2009), with 35 U.S.C. § 261
(Ownership; assignment: “[p]atents shall have the attributes of personal property.”).
127
HULL, supra note 29, at 3.
128
See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (involving a license contract
for a keyholder design, the court stated “[c]ommercial agreements traditionally are the domain of state
law.”); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 661 (1969) (noting “the California Supreme Court's construction
of the 1955 licensing agreement was decided solely as a matter of state law”); Imation Corp. v. Koninklijke
Philips Elecs. N.V., 586 F.3d 980, 985 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Power Lift, Inc. v. Weatherford Nipple-Up
Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“A license agreement is a contract governed by ordinary
principles of state contract law.”)).
129
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch.1, intro., § 201(1), § 202(5) (1981) (“Wherever
reasonable, the manifestations of intention of the parties to a promise or agreement are interpreted as
consistent with each other and with any relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of
trade.”); Epistar Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 566 F.3d 1321, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating that the
settlement agreement binds the parties, as understood and intended by them); Lamle, 394 F.3d at 1364
(relying on the Restatement for the definition of the completeness of a patent license).
130
The American Law Institute drafted the Restatement and, together with National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, drafted the U.C.C. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS Vol. I, 31–32, 41 (3d ed. 2004)(“[S]ince the creative forces of contract law had traditionally
been judicial rather than legislative, scholars tended to regard contract law as essentially case law and to
seek these generalities in judicial decisions. . . . This emphasis on case law was reinforced by the American
Law Institute. . . . [T]he Institute undertook to reduce the mass of case law to a body of readily accessible
rules in the form of a Restatement of the Law . . . .” In contrast, “The origins of the U.C.C. lie in the law
merchant, a specialized body usages, or customs, that governed contracts dealing with commercial matters
until the seventeenth century.”) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH]. Finally, Corbin unites the two. “While it is a
statute that courts must apply, the interpretation, application, and construction of the sections of Article 2
123
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important legislation affecting contract law was the enactment of UCC2, 131 which has
been adopted by all states except Louisiana. 132 On the other hand, the Restatement is only
persuasive authority. 133
¶34
Both the UCC2 and the Restatement arguably allow a provision for parties to select
a choice of time and of law of a state. U.C.C. § 1-301, applicable to UCC2, expressly
permits contracting parties to select a territorial choice of law—the provision does not
even require a “reasonable relation” to the chosen state. 134 Also, U.C.C. § 1-302(a)
suggests it may be possible to expand territorial choice of law to include a choice of time
of law because § 1-302(a) allows “variation by agreement.” Not only can parties “change
the legal consequences that would otherwise flow from the provisions of the U.C.C.,” but
the Official Comments state, “Subsection (a) states affirmatively at the outset that
freedom of contract is a principle of the Uniform Commercial Code.” 135 By contrast, the
Restatement itself does not have a provision on choice of law; rather, the official
comments of various sections refer to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,
which does permit freedom to choose by contract.136 Chapter 8 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, which is most relevant to choice of law, states that contract terms
or provisions are prohibited only when they violate public policy. 137 If there is no
intractable violation, “[i]n general, parties may contract as they wish, and courts will
enforce their agreements without passing on their substance.” 138 These aspects suggest
that neither the UCC nor the Restatement pose any real obstacle to a choice of time of
law clause.
¶35
Moreover, recent case law confirms the foregoing of the more liberal provisions
and comments in the UCC2 and the Restatement. For example, in patent licensing, most
of the reported cases enforce contractual choices of law, unless the choice violates a
fundamental public policy of the forum state. 139 Some decisions even relate the rights of
contract law directly with the right to choose the particular law with which to interpret
and enforce the contract. Applying state contract and choice of laws, the Fourth Circuit
stated, “[P]arties enjoy full autonomy to choose controlling law with regard to matters
within their contractual capacity.” 140 Likewise, the Tenth Circuit expressed,
Because conflicts of law are inevitable in a federal system, parties to a contract
are empowered to and frequently do choose a particular state's law to apply to the

continue to manifest a common law approach consistent with the views of the principal draftsman of
Article 2.” CORBIN ON CONTRACTS DESK EDITION, supra note 123, § 1.01.
131
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS DESK EDITION, supra note 123 at § 1.01; Karl N. Llewellyn, Why We Need
the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 367, 378 (1957). (“[T]he heart of the code . . . is Article
2.”).
132
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS DESK EDITION, supra note 123 at § 43; HULL, supra note 29, at 3.
133
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS DESK EDITION, supra note 123 at § 1.01.
134
U.C.C. § 1-301 (2009) (Territorial Applicability; Parties' Power to Choose Applicable Law; Official
Comments: Summary of changes from former law).
135
Id. at § 1-302 (Variation by Agreement).
136
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). See supra Sections III.D and IV for
discussion.
137
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178, ch. 8 (Unenforceability due to public policy).
138
Id. ch. 8, intro.
139
RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 2:58 (2009).
140
Barnes Grp., Inc. v. C & C Prods., Inc., 716 F.2d 1023, 1029 n.10 (4th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
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execution and interpretation of the contract. Absent special circumstances, courts
usually honor the parties’ choice of law because two ‘prime objectives’ of
contract law are ‘to protect the justified expectations of the parties and to make it
possible for them to foretell with accuracy what will be their rights and liabilities
under the contract.’ 141

Many state court decisions have expressed that the primary objectives of contract law are
to enable the parties to fulfill their expectations and give them the ability to predict the
outcome of their contract with accuracy. 142
¶36
Finally, like the federal decisions in United States Trust or Home Building, some
state court decisions also provide that “[t]he laws that are in force at the time parties enter
into a contract are merged with the other obligations that are specifically set forth in the
agreement.” 143 Aside from Pennsylvania, at least ten other state courts made similar
statements. 144 Both Pennsylvania and Illinois adopted an even more aggressive stance
finding that “[a]ny law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention
of the parties . . . [or] imposing conditions not expressed therein or dispensing with the
performance of those which are a part of it, impairs its obligation, whether the law affects
the validity, construction, duration, or enforcement of the contract.” 145 The parties are
presumed to be aware of applicable statutes and to intend to incorporate them. 146 Given
these sentiments, at least a number of states arguably would enforce a choice of time of
law clause, especially a “freezing” clause, which selects laws existing at the time the
contract was executed.
¶37
In sum, a logical extension of the presently enforceable choice of law provision
should include adding a provision to select the choice of time of law based on existing
law or on future law. Such a technique would further fulfill the parties’ expectations and
aid their ability to predict the outcome of their contract with accuracy as supported by
state contract law.

141

Boyd Rosene & Assocs., Inc. v. Kansas Mun. Gas Agency, 174 F.3d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1999)
(emphasis added). See also Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 428 (10th Cir. 2006). Similarly, the
Sixth Circuit agreed with the Tenth; see Meijer, Inc. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., No. 94-1152, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19951 at *8 (6th Cir. July 21, 1995).
142
See, e.g., MCS Servs., Inc. v. Coronel, No. 289729-V, 2008 WL 2400867 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 4,
2008); Erwin v. Cotter Health Ctrs., Inc., 167 P.3d 1112 (Wash. 2007); Hall v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 876
N.E.2d 1036 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Modroo v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. DV-03-620, 2004 Mont.
Dist. LEXIS 3724, at *16 (Mont. Dist. Feb. 9, 2004); Register v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Nos. C020318, 2003 WL 1571597, ¶ 10 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2003).
143
Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 684 A.2d 1047, 1059 (Pa. 1996) (citing Walsh v. Sch.
Dist. of Phila., 22 A.2d 909 (Pa. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942)).
144
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 87, § 24.26 (citing cases from OK, AK, MD, FL, UT, CO, MO,
NM, OH, WY). Sometimes, states’ decisions hold that the laws are implied in the contracts. Id. § 24.26
n.533.
145
Parsonese v. Midland Nat'l Ins. Co., 706 A.2d 814, 816 (Pa. 1998) (emphasis added). Like the U.S.
Constitution, state constitutions sometimes expressly do not permit retroactive application of legislation.
See, e.g., id. at 819; Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 483 N.E.2d 226 (Ill. 1985).
146
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 87, § 24.26, n.535 (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)).
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C. Laws Regarding Stabilization Clauses in International Contracts
¶38

Pioneering concepts tend to be met with opposition. There is evidence of this in
both contract and patent law. Even after many years, the 2003 amendments to U.C.C.
Articles 2 and 2A have yet to be adopted by any state. 147 UCC Article 2B, which
governed intellectual property licenses, has died altogether. 148 Also, the revised 2007
Patent Reform Bill is still winding its way through Congress in 2011. 149 Fortunately,
there already exist real-life examples of contract provisions that include a choice of time
of law in international contracts. As such, there is evidence that the concept at least
works to some extent. Also, international contracts provide useful insights as to how the
clauses should be implemented domestically.
¶39
Among international contracts, there are so-called “stabilization” clauses that
attempt to overcome the application of new legislation that may be inconsistent with the
terms of a preexisting contract. 150 The provision is implemented proactively to reduce
the risk to investors doing business in developing nations that have fluctuating governing
laws. 151 Because these international contracts are usually between a large private
company, like Exxon-Mobil and a foreign state in control of the minerals of that country
(e.g. oil fields), 152 the state potentially has the authority to revise laws in an arbitrary
manner. 153 The concerns in the international situation are similar to those in United
States Trust, where the Supreme Court held that a state may not revise the laws in a way
that relieves the state of its previous contractual obligations. 154 Among international
circles, there is some resistance toward the use of stabilization clauses due to sociopolitical and anti-sovereignty implications. 155 However, there are also persuasive
147

HULL, supra note 29, at 3.
See generally Peter B. Maggs, The Effect of Proposed Amendments to Uniform Commercial Code
Article 2, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 311 (2002).
149
Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Moving Forward, PATENTLYO (Feb. 25, 2010, 4:16 PM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/02/patent-reform-moving-forward.html.
150
See, e.g., SHEMBERG, supra note 31; Lorenzo Cotula, Regulatory Takings, Stabilization Clauses and
Sustainable Development, OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (Mar. 27, 2008),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/8/40311122.pdf.
151
See, e.g., Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Book Reviews and Notes, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 669, 701 (1983)
(reviewing PATRICK COURBE, LES OBJECTIFS TEMPORELS DES REGLES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE
(1981)). Patrick Courbe was one of the earliest proponents of time of law clauses in various types of
international contracts.
152
J. Nna Emeka, Anchoring Stabilization Clauses in International Petroleum Contracts, 42 INT’L LAW
1317, 1318–19 (2008).
153
Some foreign governments confiscate the development equipment and oil production despite the
existence of a contract. Id. at 1319–20 (citing examples in Russia, the government of Vladimir Putin
acquired Gazprom and revoked a permit for a Shell oil and gas project; in Chad, the government demanded
that international operators Chevron, Exxon, and Petronas renegotiate their revenue share; in Venezuala,
President Hugo Chavez took control of the formerly independent Petroleos de Venezuala, forcing out
Exxon and Conoco-Phillips; in Bolivia and Ecuador, the governments nationalized the oil and gas fields
and assumed control of the holdings of Occidental). Thus, the stabilization clauses in contracts sometimes
proved ineffective, internationally, because the foreign state is the sole or at least primary decision maker.
154
When a state is party to a contract, the courts apply heightened scrutiny out of concerns of unfairness.
United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29 (1977) (applying a “reasonable and
necessary” standard).
155
The clauses continue to be used in modern day practice in mining contracts, including oil and gas in
Africa, Eastern and Southern Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. SHEMBERG, supra
note 31, at ix; Cotula, supra note 150, at 4. The way it works is that some foreign states dangle fiscal
incentives to attract investments. Emeka, supra note 152, at 131. A private company then commits much
148
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counterarguments that justify their use. 156 In addition, international arbitral tribunals
have upheld the stabilization provision by reason that a country’s entry into a contract is
itself an exercise of sovereignty. 157 In any case, this paper considers only domestic
contracts between purely-private parties, which are unlike international contracts between
a foreign ruling state and a private investor. 158 Thus, some of the international problems
would not exist in the domestic context, and therefore and a choice of time of law clause
would be workable. 159
¶40
In international contracts, there are different types of stabilization clauses: freezing,
hybrid and economic equilibrium clauses. 160 With freezing clauses in contracts, “the
applicable . . . law is the one in force at the time the contract is concluded, to the
exclusion of subsequent legislation.” 161 By contrast, hybrid clauses permit an adaptation
mechanism where the foreign state compensates the investor should subsequent
legislation increase the investor’s financial burden. 162 Lastly, equilibrium clauses link
any alterations to the scope of the contract, which are due to changes in the law, to
contract renegotiations in order to restore its original economic intent. 163 Equilibrium
clauses create inherent uncertainty because parties might not reach a new agreement
altogether, which is a scenario that goes against the purpose of the proposed solution of
this paper. 164 Therefore, only the other two types of clauses are considered in this paper.
capital, expertise and technology know-how that remains with the foreign state even after the project. Id.
A contract with a stabilization clause is negotiated between the state and the private company. But, people
in developing nations are rather angry with the practice, feeling trapped into accepting stabilization
provisions in order to get investment dollars. SHEMBERG, supra note 31, at vii (“Concerns about
stabilization clauses and human rights arose in . . . 2003 when the oil company BP published its private
investment contracts relating to a major cross-border pipeline project.”). The argument is that these clauses
are contrary to the concept of sovereignty of the host country. Cotula, supra note 150, at 3–4. The concern
is decades old. See, e.g., Hugh A. Rawlins, Aspects of the UNCITRAL Regimes for Procurement and for
International Commercial Arbitration, and Government International Commercial Contracts in the
Commonwealth Caribbean, 7 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 41, 72–73 (1997). Moreover, the clauses may
exempt investment projects even from new laws aimed at protecting human rights. SHEMBERG, supra note
31, at viii.
156
Rather than stepping on sovereignty, the argument is that because a state itself is making the contract,
“a State may not invoke the cloak of sovereignty to disavow earlier commercial contractual commitments.”
Emeka, supra note 152, at 1324.
157
Id.
158
Indeed, both private parties in domestic contracts are equally at the mercy of whatever new laws may
arise in the U.S. A new law or court decision may disadvantage either party with equal probability in the
U.S. As a result, this avoids any negative aspects associated with the international contracts. Moreover,
U.S. courts can apply the paper’s proposed Test in U.S. contract disputes and objectively check whether a
time of law a provision (i.e. the contract) could be enforced, all in a neutral fashion without favoring either
party at the outset.
159
Christopher T. Curtis, The Legal Security of Economic Development Agreements, 29 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 317, 336–38 (1988) (arguing why governments should not interfere with stabilization clauses used in
international contracts).
160
SHEMBERG, supra note 31, at 17–19.
161
Cotula, supra note 150, at 6.
162
Emeka, supra note 152, at 1321.
163
Cotula, supra note 150, at 6.
164
The economic equilibrium flavor of stabilization could also be useful in domestic contracts, but only
in limited situations. First, the international contracts span about forty years or more and involve very large
investments. Emeka, supra note 152, at 1318. Unless a domestic contract is that long in duration and that
expensive, it seems impractical to make the choice of time provision overly complicated to include the
possibility of a renegotiation. Patents, for example, last less than twenty years and technology becomes
obsolete quickly; so patent licenses may last only ten years or less. Second, while the economic
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A hybrid stabilization contract clause may be of great utility in domestic affairs
because the contract is preserved when there are new laws. The parties would follow the
new laws in interpreting and executing the contract, but one party may have to indemnify
the other for additional costs incurred. There are domestic contract attorneys who favor
the hybrid approach or practice it to some extent already. 165 The method is akin to
provisions in contracts that attempt to allocate and shift risks by providing for future
contingencies. 166 For example, food makers negotiate contracts to buy food-packages
and prefer that package manufacturers make up the difference in price if the tax rate
changes or if the packages have to meet new safety regulations. 167 A better-known
example occurs in construction contracts, where new regulations may require an edifice
be built to new specifications. 168 If meeting the new specifications entails significant cost
overruns, both parties might share in the costs if their original contract had been
presciently drafted with all possible new regulations in mind. 169 In these situations, a
choice of time of law provision could serve the contracting parties well in anticipating all
changes; then, if laws do change the parties could agree a priori to a shared cost
adjustment formula based on, for example, a threshold cost increase. 170
equilibrium contracts have grown in popularity internationally, renegotiating a contract is fraught with
perils. For one thing, what is the threshold for mandating a renegotiation? For another, the parties may not
reach a new agreement, particularly if the law has changed so much so as to invalidate their contract or
revise its scope drastically. Other than good faith, there may not be anything left to encourage the parties to
form a new contract. SHEMBERG, supra note 31, at 6. For instance, if the previously-licensed patent
suddenly became invalid as a result of Bilski or KSR, there is no incentive whatsoever for the licensee to
continue with a license. If the parties cannot reach a new agreement, perhaps they would necessarily have
to submit to arbitration or go to court. This prospect and the general uncertainty of economic equilibrium
contracts in the event of new law defeat the entire purpose of the proposed solution in this paper—to have
some mechanism by contract to provide contracting parties more certainty, stability, and peace of mind
after they entered into a contract. The goal is to reduce litigation, arbitration, and uncertainty.
165
Interview with Susan Chao, supra 74. In small mom and pop deals—such as around-the-house
construction projects for a new kitchen, etc.—parties may very well renegotiate costs if something
unexpected happens—such as when the economy collapsed and so on.
166
See George G. Triantis, Unforeseen Contingencies: Risk Allocation in Contracts, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS, 100 (1999), http://encyclo.findlaw.com/4500book.pdf.
167
Interview with Susan Chao, supra note 74.
168
See Viacom, Inc. v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 649, 663 (Fed. Cl. 2006) (“[W]here the pension costs
are attributable to contracts that were entered into before the effective date of the revised CAS 413, either
the contractor or the government is entitled to an equitable adjustment to the extent that the contractor or
the government is liable for more under the revised CAS 413 than they would have been liable for under
the original CAS 413.”); Kearfott Guidance & Navigation Corp. v. Rumsfeld, 320 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (contending that when a party enters into a contract with the government after a new regulation takes
effect, the parties are bound by the new regulation). Also, Boston’s Big Dig project has spiraled in costs
from $2.6 billion to $14.8 billion.
169
A cost overrun is often resolved by passing it to the consumer rather than to either party. See, e.g.,
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 367 (1988) (describing how the cost of the
nuclear power plant overran and the consumers utility bill had to be increased); Sovereign Bank v. BJ's
Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2008). In cost overrun cases in U.S. courts, the
contracting parties raise many issues—i.e., good faith, deceptive practices, problems restructuring the
contract—regarding the overrun.
170
This kind of bargaining seems intuitively logical and reasonable. Recently, my neighbor had to move
out early due to a job change and she negotiated to pay part of her lease-breaking penalty. The landlord
agreed; so, my neighbor and landlord each gained and lost a bit of money. However, if international cases
are any lesson, a major study undertaken in 2008 for the World Bank and the United Nations states, “There
appear to be no reported cases where economic equilibrium or hybrid clauses have been enforced in either
private or international arbitration, so it is not clear how such clauses would be dealt with in the context of
arbitration.” SHEMBERG, supra note 31, at 37. The study summarizes, “it is unclear how these clauses
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Finally, a simple freezing clause may be the best solution. However, even simple
freezing clauses can be uncertain along multiple dimensions. In the international context,
there are full freezing clauses that attempt to freeze the application of both fiscal and nonfiscal laws for the duration of the contract. An example is:
Specific Juridical Stability: The State guarantees . . . the Recipient Company that
this Investment Contract . . . shall enjoy absolute legal stability in accordance
with the Legal Framework in Effect. Accordingly, neither the Investment
Contract, nor [other agreements] . . . may be modified unilaterally by laws or
other dispositions from the State of any type that affect them or by changes in the
interpretation or application thereof and each thereof in which the State is a party
may only be modified by the mutual written agreement of the Parties that
expressly evidences such modifications. 171

In addition, there are limited freezing clauses that aim to protect the investor from a
limited set of legislative actions. 172 For example, the international clauses may refer only
to tax and customs regulations. 173 Other limited freezing clauses may simply list the
types of laws that are pertinent to the contract, or list certain sets of exempt laws. 174
¶43
Although freezing clauses in the oil and gas industry have largely fallen out of use
in favor of modern economic equilibrium clauses, 175 this paper submits that their
simplicity makes them more readily enforceable. First, this is evidenced by the fact that
the clauses were still used in about 16% of international contracts in the 1990s and
2000s. 176 Presumably, sophisticated corporate lawyers expect the freezing clause to be
valid and enforceable at least to some extent. Second, freezing clauses require less work
than other stabilizing clauses. The other types of stabilization clauses necessitate not
only determining whether there is “new” law, but also adopting subsequent remedial
action based on a fuzzy good faith standard when new laws do arise. A freezing
provision on the other hand, simply keeps the status quo. The parties theoretically do not
need to renegotiate the contract with the other party when new laws emerge. 177
¶44
In summary, for short-term contracts, 178 this paper recommends freezing clauses for
their simplicity or hybrid clauses for providing easily-calculated compensation schemes
when detrimental laws do arise. 179 For long-term contracts, the hybrid approach may be
would be enforced formally and whether they would potentially result in monetary compensation.” Id.
Therefore, keeping the choice of time of law provision simple, certain and easily enforceable is a high
priority. A simple freezing clause may be the best bet initially in domestic contracts.
171
SHEMBERG, supra note 31, at 6 (quoting a Latin American infrastructure model agreement 2000s).
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 6–7.
176
Id. at 20.
177
The parties should have already obtained insurance to deal with cost overruns that may results from
changes in law.
178
An example is sale of food contracts. Apparently, they are generally quite short in duration due to
market fluctuations in food prices and stabilization clauses for changes in law seem unnecessary. See
Interview with Susan Chao, supra note 74.
179
In the past, some researchers have questioned the enforceability of freezing clauses in either common
law or civil law countries. “Common law countries quite generally seem to adhere to principles which do
not allow the parties to fetter by contract the executive powers of government or the legislative power of
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more ideal. Even though hybrid approaches to contracts are more difficult to negotiate,
their long-term nature counterbalances the additional effort expended during the
negotiation effort. Additionally, the hybrid approach of stabilization appears to be
favored internationally today.
IV. COMPATIBILITY WITH THE RULES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS
¶45

Conflict of Laws rules are highly relevant to a choice of time of law clause, because
the clause is essentially an extension of the traditionally-accepted choice of law provision
in contracts. 180 Conflict of Laws rules might very well govern a choice of time of law
clause. Unfortunately, the “Laws” are rather divergent among the different states. 181 As
a result, there are practical hurdles challenging the actual implementation of such clauses.
This Section gives an overview of some obstacles, examines the traditional choice of law
clause and the Restatement (Second) on the Conflict of Laws, and explains why the
provisions in the Restatement should support a new, express choice of time of law clause.
Finally, courts readily enforce the existing choice of law provisions for reasons of
litigation efficiency; by the same rationale, a choice of time of law provision should find
favor as well.
¶46
The first obstacle to the implementation of a choice of time of law provision is the
potential reluctance of practitioners to implement these provisions. There are two camps
of thought regarding even the traditional choice of law provision. First, a majority of
practitioners favor having a choice of law provision. 182 “Choice of governing law is
essential. Absent such a choice, there may be circumstances under which the parties do
not know if their conduct breaches the agreement, or what the available remedies for such
a breach are.” 183 Clearly, parties want to choose the particular state law that is most
beneficial to them. “The failure to include a choice of law provision means increased
costs to clients and the judicial system, because without an effective selection by a party,
choice of law provisions and choice of law rules are based on indeterminate and often

the legislature . . . .” Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment
Commitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 215, 235 (1996). But,
contrary to this concern is that freezing clauses have actually been upheld in international arbitration and
sovereignty has not been transgressed. See, e.g., id. at 267 (citing eight prominent cases). A secondary
benefit is that if these types of contracts are also implemented and upheld domestically, then the ones that
Americans negotiate internationally are much stronger. Domestic and international practices would be
harmonized. Foreign countries cannot complain that they are somehow being disadvantaged by American
practices. And at the same time, Americans gain an additional option in their ability and freedom to
contract domestically.
180
Scholars generally treat choice of law as one aspect of the study of conflict of laws, which centers on
transactions that have legal implications involving more than one sovereign. WILLIAM M. RICHMAN &
WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (3d ed. 2002).
181
See e.g., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 87, § 12.18; Harold P. Southerland, Sovereignty, Value
Judgments, and Choice of Law, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 451, 452 (2000).
182
This is at least true in patent licensing. See NIMMER & DODD, supra note 139, § 2:58 (“In part
because of the confusing and uncertain background law, most licenses specify what law governs disputes
relating to a license.”). See also, BRIAN G. BRUNSVOLD, DENNIS O’REILLY & D. BRIAN KACEDON,
DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS 266 (6th ed. 2008).
183
Ian N. Feinberg, Standard and Not So Standard Terms in Intellectual Property License Agreements
(aka Boilerplate), 985 PLI/PAT 777, 809 (2009).
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fact-intensive inquires [sic] by the courts.” 184 This means lawyers will spend less time
litigating; it would be thus “negligent” to not include such clauses. 185
¶47
Second, a minority of practitioners choose to not select a choice of law because
these attorneys do not put much faith in the clauses believe that courts are unlikely to
uphold them. 186 However, the reality is that courts generally do uphold express clauses
when not dealing with consumer or employment contracts. 187
¶48
Another concern over the implementation of choice of law provisions is the time
and cost required to analyze which particular state laws are most beneficial to a party.188
However, the merits of this concern are questionable, particularly when an attorney
practices primarily in one area of law and should be familiar with the most beneficial
state laws. Yet another concern is that some parties fear they will be locked into a less
beneficial law at the time of litigation. 189 However, this is the very problem this paper
proposes to solve. Locking a contract into a particular law at the time of contract (i.e.
freeze clause) should be beneficial, or at the very least more certain, so that an attorney
may draft the other provisions of the contract knowing the law and including
workarounds to any detrimental law that may exist. Working on known problems seems
far superior to gambling on an unknown state’s law, or worse, new laws that may be
detrimental or may take years to settle. Alternatively, if the laws existing at the time of
contract are especially unfavorable, parties could contract to elect future anticipated law.
For example, the Patent Reform bill that is now before Congress is expected to pass and
impact damage awards and patent licensing. Parties to a license can opt for this future
law by contract. In conclusion, unless the parties were not able to agree to a particular
choice, there seems little reason not to include one. 190
¶49
The second issue is that even traditional choice of law rules diverge among the
different states. One divergent aspect is due to the fact that court decisions could hinge
on whether the choice of law provisions are considered procedural or substantive
matters. 191 As such, throwing in yet another provision—a choice of time of law clause—
might compound the problems even further and thus prove challenging. Intuitively, a
184

David Hricik, Infinite Combinations: Whether the Duty of Competency Requires Lawyers to Include
Choice of Law Clauses in Contracts They Draft for Their Clients, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DIS. RES.
241, 242 (2004).
185
See id. at 243 (citing Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2002: The
Sixteenth Annual Survey, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 3 n.3 (2003) (publishing a study showing that judges had to
resolve choice of law and conflict of laws problems in 2002)).
186
Richard J. Bauerfeld, Note, Effectiveness of Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contract Conflicts of Law:
Party Autonomy or Objective Determination?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1659, 1669–70 (1982).
187
This is true in, for example patent licensing. See NIMMER & DODD, supra note 139, § 2:59. And the
dearth of controversial cases over express provisions suggests that courts are amenable to them. The
annual survey provided by Dean Symeonides shows that the contract cases which do crop up are typically
only consumer and employment cases, where there is naturally unequal bargaining power. See Symeon
Symeonides, Conflict of Laws, WILLAMETTE LAW ONLINE,
http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/journals/wlo/conflicts/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2011).
188
Dean Symeonides provides an annual study of the choice of law rules in each state to sort out the
intricacies. Id.
189
Hricik, supra note 184, at 257.
190
If parties know an issue will be contentious, perhaps parties will avoid or let the issue go.
191
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 8, intro. (1971)(“Contracts is one of the most
complex and most confused areas of choice of law. This complexity results in part from . . . the many
different kinds of contracts and of issues involving contracts and by the many relationships a single
contract may have to two or more states.”).
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choice of law seems procedural, but this is not always the case. 192 Worse still, there is
difficulty in ascertaining the rules from state to state and even from court to court,
because the rules are almost entirely judge-made. 193 Local courts within a state may even
decide to use the rules and laws of another state for sometimes-obscure reasons, 194 so it
may be uncertain as to what the ultimate governing law might be. Fortunately, most
courts probably consider choice of law as a procedural issue, because forum courts have
an interest in calling an issue “procedural” as a way of ensuring that the forum protects its
own interest in the application of its own laws. 195 On the other hand, the Constitution
imposes some limitations on state powers to characterize an issue as procedural and then
to determine the issue in accordance with its own local law. 196 Also, the comments of
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws section 122 expressly disclaim attempts to
classify issues as substantive or procedural. 197 Even so, as a result of these uncertainties,
a choice of time of law clause is likely to inherit the problems that already exist with
regular choice of laws rules. Each court may try to individually resolve whether it
192

Boyd Rosene & Assocs., Inc. v. Kansas Mun. Gas Agency, 174 F.3d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1999)
(“what is substantive or procedural for Erie purposes is not necessarily substantive or procedural for
choice-of-law purposes”) (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1988)); Imation Corp. v.
Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V., 586 F.3d 980, 985 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“As the Agreement provides that it
shall be ‘construed, governed, interpreted and applied in accordance with the laws of the State of New
York,’ . . . this court will apply New York substantive law in interpreting the Agreement”) (citing Parental
Guide of Texas, Inc. v. Thomson, Inc., 446 F.3d 1265, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2006)); RICHMAN & REYNOLDS,
supra note 180, § 1 at 179 (“[T]he impact of the U.S. Constitution on conflict problems . . . is sometimes
quite significant (e.g. jurisdiction) and sometimes hardly evident at all (e.g. choice of law).”).
Intuitively, choice of time of law seems to be procedural. Such clauses are unlike the substance of an
agreement as the type and quantity of objects for sale, the duration, exclusivity of ownership, and so on.
Also, the regular choice of law is a step in the procedure of deciding a case, along with the standard of
review and other procedures. Courts choose the appropriate law and then move to the merits of the case.
See, e.g., Imation Corp., 586 F.3d at 985; Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 487 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (applying state law because the Settlement Agreement provides in Article 8.9 that it is to
be interpreted under Minnesota law; the Court settled the procedural issues, and then moved on to the main
discussion.). But, intuition is not foolproof. For example, local rules themselves, which are used to choose
the appropriate law (or uphold the choice of law by contract), may be substantive. Jeffrey D. Dunn, Texas
Choice of Law Analysis for Contracts, 40 TEX. J. BUS. L. 37, 47 (2004). “[I]f the court has determined that
the matter is substantive, then it looks to the substantive law of the forum state, including its choice of law
principles, to determine the applicable substantive law.” Boyd Rosene, 174 F.3d at 1118.
193
Southerland, supra note 181, at 452.
194
For example, in Texas, the choice of law clause must be conspicuous. Also, if the overall contract is
for the sale of goods less than $50,000, the law of another state will be selected. Dunn, supra note 192, at
62–3.
195
RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 180, §§ 58–59 (“Substance—procedure dichotomy. The courts
have traditionally approached issues falling within the scope of the rule of this Section by determining
whether the particular issue was ‘procedural’ and therefore to be decided in accordance with the forum's
local law rule, or ‘substantive’ and therefore to be decided by reference to the otherwise applicable law. . . .
To avoid encouraging errors of that sort, the rules stated in this Chapter do not attempt to classify issues as
‘procedural’ or ‘substantive.’ Instead they face directly the question whether the forum's rule should be
applied.”) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122, cmt. b (1971)).
196
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397
(1930).
197
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws avoids classifying issues as “procedural” or
“substantive,” instead querying whether local rules apply or not. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 comment. b. “A court usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how
litigation shall be conducted even when it applies the local law rules of another state to resolve other issues
in the case.” Id. Also, “[c]ommonly, it is said that the forum will apply its own local law to matters of
procedure and the otherwise applicable law to matters of substance.” Id. at ch. 6, intro. note at 350.
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considers a choice of time of law clause to be procedural or substantive. Regardless,
ideally, the choice of time of law provision would be adopted by many states 198 as state
legislation in order to harmonize the rules.199 This is a daunting prospect considering that
only about twenty-three states have even adopted 200 the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws, which was finalized over forty years ago and could have unified the rules for the
choice of law. 201
¶50
Aside from these obstacles, the principles underlying the choice of laws for
contracts grow ever more liberal and thus a choice of time of law clause should still find
favor among practitioners. 202 Since Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is
accepted by about half the states, it is useful to examine the Restatement as being
representative and authoritative. Chapter 8 of the Restatement is devoted entirely to
contracts. 203 Sections 186 and 187 of Chapter 8 favor “party autonomy,” where parties
can choose the law to govern “rights and duties” arising under contract. 204 Party
autonomy as expressed in section 187 appears to be a nearly universal principle in the
United States. 205 However, Chapter 8 also recognizes certain limitations as expressed in
section 187 and these limitations would presumably also apply to a choice of time of law
clause. 206 Party autonomy is only true for those contract matters where parties have free
choice, and not for matters beyond the parties’ contractual capacity. 207 For instance, the
chosen law, at the chosen time, should have some substantial relation to the contract.208
198

As for federal courts, a federal trial court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply the law of the
forum state to determine the choice of law. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497
(1941).
199
JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, CONFLICTS LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTS (2000) (concluding that
legislation to codify choice of law rules to govern contract-related issues is the best approach to harmonize
the chaotic judicial decisions), available at http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/olc/conflict_report.pdf.
200
See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009: Twenty-Third Annual
Survey, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 227 (2010). Alternatively, some states adopt only portions of the Restatement
(Second) Conflict of Laws. See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 192, at 39.
201
Willis L.M. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited, 34 MERCER L. REV. 501
(1983). Professor Reese of Columbia University was the Reporter for the project.
202
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS Ch. 8, intro. The Second Restatement liberalizes the
First Restatement, which did not acknowledge any power in the parties to choose the applicable law. This
increased freedom is a positive indication that the Restatements (ALI) could conceivably favor a choice of
time of law.
203
See id. (“In the Restatement of this Subject, the term ‘contract’ is used to refer both to legally
enforceable promises and to other agreements or promises which are claimed to be enforceable but are not
legally so.”).
204
Id. §§ 186, 187(1) (1971) (Section 186 states “Applicable Law Issues in contract are determined by
the law chosen by the parties in accordance with the rule of § 187 and otherwise by the law selected in
accordance with the rule of § 188.”). See also RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 180, § 74(b)(3), at 224–
25.
205
EUGENE F. SCOLES ET. AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 980 (4th ed. 2004). This study also stated that
subsection 1 of § 187 provides that, for issues that the parties “could have resolved by an explicit provision
in their agreement,” the parties’ choice of law is not subject to any geographical or substantive limitations.
206
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS Ch. 8, intro (“The present Chapter recognizes that
the parties have [the power to choose the applicable law] subject to certain limitations (see § 187).”).
207
See Bauerfeld, supra note 186, at 1660. In this respect, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
parallels the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Also, if a contract or term is unconscionable at the time
the contract is made, a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to
avoid any unconscionable result. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208.
208
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (“Application of the law of the chosen
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But, section 187(2) softens the substantial relation criterion to one where any “reasonable
basis” exists for doing so. 209 A good faith effort to create certainty by contract and to
reduce future litigation costs arguably comprises a “reasonable basis” 210 for
implementing a choice of time of law provision.
¶51
Further supporting a choice of time of law clause is the large amount of case law
promoting the idea that the proper choice of law in a contract is the law that conforms to
the parties’ intent and expectations. 211 For example, the Eighth Circuit held that an antiwaiver provision in the Minnesota Franchise Act was not sufficient to overcome
Minnesota's countervailing policy of enforcing contractual choice of law provisions 212
state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the
chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the
state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.”). However, if the
difference in policy between the chosen law and forum law is not significant, party autonomy may prevail.
See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Manpower, Inc., 531 F.2d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 1976) (regarding business covenants
not to compete).
Because of the substantial relation criteria, the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws is somewhat
more restrictive than contract law. Parties would be wise to have some contacts with the state whose laws
they choose. For instance, parties deciding to contract to gamble within the territory of a state that
prohibits gambling probably cannot select the laws of, for example, Nevada. See, e.g., Bauerfeld, supra
note 186, at 1661 n.9 (citing Louis C. James, The Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on the Validity of
Conflict of Laws "Illegal Contracts"–Sunday, Gambling, Lottery, and Other Agreements, 8 AM. U. L. REV.
67, 86 (1959)). On the other hand, if they place bets with a Nevada company (place of performance), then,
they should be able to select Nevada law, particularly if the contract is also contract there (place of
contract). See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 188 (listing place of performance as a
factor in determining the most significant relationship); Intercontinental Hotel Corp. (Puerto Rico) v.
Golden, 203 N.E.2d 210 (N.Y. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 188 (1971) (stating
the place of contract is a factor in determining the most significant relationship). Regardless, the limitation
should not matter to a choice of time of law unless the laws of the chosen state, by chance, changes in such
a way as to critically affect the particular activity—say, the chosen state bans placing bets with Nevada
companies altogether. Other than this unlikely scenario, a choice of time of law should be an acceptable
addition to the Restatement on Conflict of Laws.
209
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. f; Farnsworth, supra note 130, at Vol. II,
19–20, 41.
210
Moreover, except for consumer contracts, the new revision of the U.C.C. has rendered even more
innocuous the requirement for a “reasonable basis.” SCOLES, supra note 205, at 982 (referring to U.C.C.
§ 1-105 (2001)).
211
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g. Also, absent contracts of adhesion, fraud
or illegality, the Sixth Circuit upholds choice of law provisions. See, e.g., Tele-Save Merch. Co. v.
Consumers Distrib. Co., 814 F.2d 1120, 1122 (6th Cir. 1987); Macurdy v. Sikov & Love, P.A., 894 F.2d
818 (6th Cir. 1990) (concerning fraud); Zogg v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 276 F.2d 861, 863 (2d Cir. 1960)
(concerning adhesion contracts, particularly in the insurance field). See also Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Olvera, 119 F.2d 584, 586 (9th Cir. 1941) (allowing a party (a circus) to
designate Florida state law, even though the party wandered from state to state and had little contacts with
Florida); Wilkinson v. Manpower, Inc., 531 F.2d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 1976) (relying on the Restatement
(Second) Conflict of Laws to uphold choice of law by contract if there are only small policy differences
between the forum and the chosen state); Symeonides, supra note 187, at 5, (showing Illinois, within the
Seventh Circuit adopted the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws that favors party autonomy). But, the
Second Circuit upholds the law selected by contract as long as the state selected has sufficient contacts with
the transaction. See, e.g., Fieger v. Pitney Bowes Credit Corp., 251 F.3d 386, 393 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Orient Overseas Container Lines (UK) Ltd., 230 F.3d 549, 556 (2d Cir. 2000));
Bauerfeld, supra note 186, at 1669–74 (stating that in New York cases, “[c]hoice-of-law clauses simply are
not followed by the courts”).
212
Modern Computer Sys., Inc. v. Modern Banking Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 734, 738–40 (8th Cir. 1989) (en
banc). The Minnesota legislature later superseded the court decision by revising the Franchise Act so that
Minnesota residents cannot waive compliance with the Act by a contractual choice-of-law clause. See
Costa v. Carambola Partners, LLC, 590 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1151 (D. Minn. 2008).
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Most notably, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld an express choice of law
provision, which could portend good implications for a choice of time of law clause. The
Court held that despite the rules of the Federal Arbitration Acts, the FAA does not
preempt state law where the private parties agreed in their contract to be bound by a
choice of law provision. 213 The Court’s rationale was that “we give effect to the
contractual rights and expectations of the parties, without doing violence to the policies
behind by the FAA.” 214 The Court adopted similar views in M/S Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co., 215 which was then followed by the lower courts with enthusiasm. 216 Although
Bremen involved a forum selection clause in a private contract between American and
German parties, the Court’s reasoning is relevant here. The clause “was an effort to
eliminate all uncertainty as to the nature, location, and outlook of the forum in which
these companies of differing nationalities might find themselves.” 217
It is settled . . . that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the
jurisdiction of a given court . . . . This approach is substantially that followed in
other common-law countries including England. It is the view advanced by noted
scholars and that adopted by the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws. It accords
with ancient concepts of freedom of contract . . . . 218

Given these sentiments of the Court, it seems reasonable to infer that a choice of time of
law clause in a contract would be judicially accepted. Such a clause is a proactive
solution consistent with the Court’s rationale of enforcing the parties’ intent to procure
certainty through and during the execution of their contract.
V. ACCEPTABLE TO PUBLIC POLICY
¶53

Public policy concerns appear to be the only real obstacle to the adoption and
enforcement of a choice of time of law clause in domestic contracts. These concerns are
inferred from how existing rules and laws are interpreted and enforced. 219 For example,
both contract law and conflict of laws rules are very liberal about enforcing choice of law
clauses in accordance with the parties’ intent and expectations, unless the parties’
decisions violate a fundamental public policy. 220 At the very least, any policy concerns
213

Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477–79 (1989).
Id. at 479.
215
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13 n.15 (1972).
216
See J. Zachary Courson, Survey: Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd.: A New Federal Standard—Applying
Contracting Parties' Choice of Law to the Analysis of Forum Selection Agreements, 85 DENV. U. L. REV.
597, 603 (2008) (citing Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 307–13 (1988)).
217
M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13 n.5. (emphasis added).
218
Id. at 11–12 (emphasis added).
219
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2) (1981) (“A contractual right can be
assigned unless . . . (b) the assignment is forbidden by statute or is otherwise inoperative on grounds of
public policy . . . .”). From conversations with Professors Gregory Crespi (contract law) and Raymond
Nimmer (intellectual property licensing), both also believe that public policy is the only obstacle.
220
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971) (“No action will be entertained on a
foreign cause of action the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum.”).
This suggests that forums do not have to apply a law that violates its own local public policy, but note that
the rule has a narrow application. See id. § 90 cmt. c (The public policy must be a “strong” one.); id.
214
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that apply to the traditional choice of law provisions would likely also apply to a choice
of time of law provision. This Section addresses the different possible types of policy
concerns that may hinder the acceptance of a choice of time of law clause. Then, this
Section proposes a set of rules or test (“Test”) to gauge whether a choice of time of law
provision should be enforceable. The proposed Test can be applied by the courts to
decide whether a choice of time of law clause should be enforceable in a particular
contract case.
¶54
Public policy varies from state to state 221 and it is a potential obstacle 222 that
litigants might encounter in any type of court action. Undoubtedly, parties would
eventually encounter it if they attempted to enforce a choice of time of law clause in a
contract. Public policy is vague in that it is hard to define and anticipate in advance.
Generally, it appears to be a “rule of reason” 223 that, ironically, seems unreasonably
fickle. 224 For example, one observer thinks “public policy” is something that a court can
invoke and magisterially sweep away the results called for by traditional rules and,
usually without much explanation, apply its own law to achieve some desired result. 225
Even with existing choice of law clauses, Corbin provides many examples where courts
balance whether to uphold a choice of law provision that might go against “policy”
concerns. 226 Such a clause is likely to be upheld as valid and enforceable, unless the
§ 187(2)(b) (“The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be
applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision
in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either . . . application of the law of the chosen state would
be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the interests of the
chosen state . . . .”). Note that public policy is so strong that it might even override a choice of law
provision. See also U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 1 (“The Uniform Commercial Code should be construed in
accordance with its underlying purposes and policies. The text of each section should be read in the light
of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Uniform Commercial Code as a
whole, and the application of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in
conformity with the purposes and policies involved.”); SCOLES, supra note 205, at 986; FARNSWORTH,
supra note 130, at Vol. II, 19–20 (An agreement with a choice of law governing the contract may be
unenforceable if “there is no . . . reasonable basis for the parties' choice.”) (citing the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a)) (1981).
221
See, e.g., Boone v. Boone, 546 S.E.2d 191, 194 (S.C. 2001) (“Because interspousal immunity
violates the public policy of South Carolina, we will no longer apply the lex loci delicti when the law of the
foreign state recognizes the doctrine.”). Examples of policy matters are stated in Nash v. Tindall Corp.,
650 S.E.2d 81, 83–84 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) (“Under the ‘public policy exception,’ the Court will not apply
foreign law if it violates the public policy of South Carolina. Foreign law may not be given effect in this
state if it is against good morals or natural justice. Examples of cases against good morals and natural
justice are ‘prohibited marriages, wagers, lotteries, racing, contracts for gaming or the sale of liquors, and
others.’”).
222
See Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 233–34 (1892) (In a patent contract case, the Court
stated, “[i]t is impossible to define with accuracy what is meant by that public policy for an interference
and violation of which a contract may be declared invalid. It may be understood in general that contracts
which are detrimental to the interests of the public as understood at the time fall within the ban. The
standard of such policy is not absolutely invariable or fixed, since contracts which at one stage of our
civilization may seem to conflict with public interests, at a more advanced stage are treated as legal and
binding.”). State courts express the same. See, e.g., Hearst-Argyle Props., Inc. v. Entrex Commc’n Servs.,
Inc., 778 N.W.2d 465, 472 (Neb. 2010) (“The power of courts to invalidate contracts for being in
contravention of public policy is a very delicate and undefined power which should be exercised only in
cases free from doubt.”).
223
FARNSWORTH, supra note 130, at Vol. II, 12 (providing sections on public policy).
224
See Pope Mfg. Co., 144 U.S. at 233–34.
225
RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 180, at 169.
226
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 87, § 79.7.
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forum state has a contrary public policy or other public interest. 227 Likewise, in
Comment (g) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, there is a warning that the
policy must be substantial before courts may override the choice of law clause in the
contract agreed to by the parties. 228 Similarly, under contract law, the 2001 Revision of
the U.C.C. promotes the same inclinations as the Restatement and allows courts fewer
reasons to invalidate a choice of law clause. 229 As such, it is reasonable to expect that
most choice of law provisions are enforceable. By extension, a choice of time of law
clause should also be enforceable, and public policy issues should not pose a real obstacle
if the parties intended to include the clause in their contracts. Furthermore, as the
following paragraphs show, an analysis of each type of public policy concern tends to
show that many policy concerns are refutable anyway.
¶55
There are two different categories of public policy that could restrict a choice of
time of law clause. The first category encompasses general concerns against enforcing
such a clause. These general concerns are perhaps better categorized as psychological
barriers rather than policy issues. They are akin to human nature’s general resistance to
change. The second category of public policy concerns encompasses issues that are fact
specific, such as concerns against gambling and lotteries in a state. For instance, Nevada
laws permit such activities, whereas Utah laws do not.
A. General Policy Concerns: A New Concept, Sovereignty and Efficiency Issues
¶56

Among the first category of policy concerns is that there is a lack of knowledge as
to the consequences of implementing a new clause or that there may be no general
incentive to include a choice of time law provision in a contract. However, at least in
patent law, food laws, health regulations, civil procedures, and local rules, there are good
reasons to include some time or freezing provision in a domestic contract. From a policy
perspective, there might be less of a reason to implement such clauses here in the United
States. In international contracts, there is a higher incentive because some foreign
governments have been very unstable and the country might have changed its laws
dramatically due to political turmoil. By contrast, the U.S. law is relatively stable. For
instance, in contract law, the revised U.C.C. Article 2 (2003) has yet to be adopted in any
state and a revised version of U.C.C. Article 2-B (1999) for information technology
licenses has been adopted by only two states so far. 230 In comparison, much of the
1950’s version of U.C.C. Article 2 has been adopted by nearly all the states and has been
fairly stable for about fifty years now. 231 On the other hand, other areas of U.S. law,
227

See id. But, perhaps Restatement (Second) of Contracts has a lower threshold in determining
whether public policy should prevail. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 178 (1981).
However, a “choice of time of law” is closer in purpose to a choice of law provision than to other
provisions and terms governed by the restatement. Therefore, the threshold set out in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws should be more applicable.
228
For example, it cannot be based merely on technical requirements, such as, formalities of the statute
of frauds, the need for consideration, or rules tending to become obsolete. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment g.
229
SCOLES, supra note 205, at 961 (citing U.C.C. § 1-301) (2011).
230
HULL, supra note 29, at 3. See generally Maggs, supra note 148; Raymond T. Nimmer, Through the
Looking Glass: What Courts and UCITA Say About the Scope of Contract Law in the Information Age, 38
DUQ. L. REV. 255 (2000).
231
HULL, supra note 29, at 3; Harry G. Kyriakodis, Past and Present ALI Projects, THE AMERICAN
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which impinge on the objects under contract, are constantly evolving and this has caused
uncertainty with existing contracts. Thus, there is a need for a choice of time of law
provision at least for some types of contracts.
¶57
Another policy concern is whether a choice of time of law clause is contrary to the
sovereign authority of states 232 to legislate and the sovereign authority of the courts to
interpret the law. 233 One purpose of the federal and state governments is to provide order
over society. Governmental entities make new laws and people are expected to follow
them. 234 For example, the federal and state governments restrict the liberty to contract,
such as, through consumer protection regulations. 235 Further, the Supreme Court has
stated that sovereign power is read into contracts in order to maintain legal order. 236
Under such circumstances, a choice of time of law clause might be perceived as an
attempt to curtail governmental sovereignty, curtailing the effect of the government’s
ability to rule and the courts’ ability to make decisions. However, a different perspective
is that courts still retain their sovereignty simply because they have the freedom and
authority to decide whether a choice of time of law clause is valid. 237 Courts have the
authority to decide amongst competing public policies when they adjudicate contract
clauses. For instance, under the federal system, the Supreme Court has the authority to
decide between the autonomy to contract versus a state’s police power. Likewise, a
legislature is free to exercise its authority and sovereignty by banning choice of time of
law clauses by statute. The very existence of such authority to decide the fate of such
clauses, in itself, constitutes sovereignty. Therefore, choice of time of law clauses should
not be considered obstacles to sovereignty. 238
LEGAL INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org/doc/past_present_ALIprojects.pdf (last updated April 2010). For
Article 2 as enacted by a particular state and any proposed revisions, see Cornell University Law School,
Uniform Commercial Code Locator– Article 2 Sales, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE (Mar. 15, 2004),
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc.html#a2.
232
See, e.g., Castleman v. Scudder, 185 P.2d 35, 37 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (“Into all contracts is
superimposed the higher authority of the state . . . .”).
233
This is a primary concern with stabilization clauses in international contracts. See, e.g., SHEMBERG,
supra note 31, at viii. See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 130, at Vol. II, 10 (describing judicially
developed policies, the policy against interfering with the judicial process).
234
Government, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/government (last visited Apr.
18, 2010) (“[T]he political direction and control exercised over the actions of the members, citizens, or
inhabitants of communities, societies, and states; direction of the affairs of a state, community, etc.;
political administration: Government is necessary to the existence of civilized society.”).
235
See, e.g., Consumer Protection, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, http://www.oag.state.tx.us/consumer
(last updated Nov. 8, 2010).
236
City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508 (1965) (“[N]ot only is the constitutional provision
qualified by the measure of control which the State retains over remedial processes, but the State also
continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. It does not matter that
legislation appropriate to that end ‘has the result of modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect.’
Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal
order. This principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum of state
power has had progressive recognition in the decisions of this Court.’”) (citation omitted).
237
International arbitral tribunals have generally upheld the stabilization provisions in international
contracts by reason that entry into a contract is itself an exercise of sovereignty. Emeka, supra note 152, at
1324.
238
Note, the sovereignty concern comes up in international contracts partly because the two negotiating
parties are unequal, or at least different, because one is a government that has sole authority to change the
laws. This is not true domestically as contemplated in this paper. The majority of contracts involve two
private parties; both are subjected to the very same new or old law governing the contracts and their
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¶58

Yet another policy concern is that choice of time of law clauses that attempt to keep
the status quo may be perceived as circumventing the progress of law. 239 However,
certain limitations on contracts, such as the duration of a contract, temper any such
concerns about retarding the progression of law. First, short-lived contracts expire before
too many laws have changed. Even if laws do change, the parties are released from their
choice of time of law obligations relatively soon after the changes. Patents have a life
span of only twenty years 240 and technology changes rapidly. 241 As a result, patent
licenses are of relatively short duration. Similarly, transactions in food or goods usually
comprise only short-term contracts because market conditions change constantly.242
Second, for longer-term contracts, one solution is that any contract with freezing clauses
can be limited in duration by parties to five years or limited only to select areas of legal
changes. Thus, long-term contracts can have limits placed upon them. Lastly, courts
reserve the power to verify whether a choice of time of law clause substantively impedes
public policy on a case-by-case basis before deciding to enforce a clause.
¶59
Finally, a policy concern of the courts is the efficiency of adjudication. 243 If a
contract has choice of time of law clause, especially a freezing provision, it may force
courts to adjudicate under prior law and to keep track of multiple sets of laws. However,
courts already undertake this task under the existing, traditional choice of law clauses in
contracts. For example, courts apply the laws of other states, 244 or the CAFC applies
regional law rather than its own set of laws in many contract cases and on civil procedure
matters. 245 Courts also retroactively apply new laws to some past events and may analyze

content. Or in the case of the governmental contracts between a state and a private party, a choice of time
of law clause might have been very appropriate to avoid litigation like in United States Trust. The various
domestic governmental entities retain the authority and the option to exercise the ultimate sovereignty over
both parties and their contract.
239
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 76 (1974) (“[C]onstitutional concepts of equal protection are
not ‘immutably frozen like insects trapped in Devonian amber.’”) (citation omitted).
240
Wyeth v. Kappos, 591 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In 1994, the law changed the effective
term of a patent from seventeen years commencing from issuance to twenty years from filing.”).
241
One circuit judge began his opinion with a lament “[t]his case illustrates how fast technology can
outdistance the capacity of contract drafters to provide for the ramifications of a computer software
licensing arrangement.” Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1116–17 (9th Cir.
1999) (attempting to determine copyright infringement on software that saw significant changes and
improvements within a mere few months after a license agreement was made). See also NIMMER, supra
note 62, at 224–43 (Ch. 5 § III. Changing Technology and Content).
242
Indeed, quantifying what represents the “food industry” is itself a near impossible task. See Sarah
Murray, The World’s Biggest Industry, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2007, 6:00 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2007/11/11/growth-agriculture-business-forbeslife-food07cx_sm_1113bigfood.html.
243
E.g. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 130, at Vol. II, 9–11 (describing judicially
developed policies, the policy against encouraging litigation).
244
See generally, Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951) (holding that a Wisconsin statutory policy
excluding Illinois wrongful death claims violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Peresipka v. Elgin,
Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 231 F.2d 268, 275 (7th Cir. 1956) (“[A]side from the principles of conflict of laws, we
are of the view under the reasoning of Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 71 S.Ct. 980, 982, 95 L.Ed. 1212,
that an Indiana court was required under the Full Faith and Credit clause of the Constitution of the United
States to give effect to the law of Illinois . . . .”).
245
See, e.g., Imation Corp. v. Koninklijke Philip Elecs. N.V., 586 F.3d 980, 985 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(applying New York contract law to a patent license); Rentrop v. Spectranetics Corp., 550 F.3d 1112, 1118
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The Federal Circuit ‘defers to the law of the regional circuits on matters of procedural
law that do not implicate issues of patent law.’”).
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two sets of laws. 246 Lastly, courts, including the Supreme Court, have applied the laws
existing at the time of contract. 247 Thus, contracts containing freezing clauses should not
pose a major hurdle during adjudication. If anything, the old laws may be better
developed and have a larger body of precedents that could facilitate adjudication as
opposed to new laws that still need to be interpreted.
B. Case Specific Policy Concerns
¶60

The second category of public policy concerns that may prevent the enforceability
of a choice of time of law clause is case specific. Courts balance policy concerns against
contractual obligations by considering several factors, including 1) the reasonableness
and necessity of the new law, 248 2) any changed circumstances and their impact, 3)
whether there were alternative solutions instead of enacting new legislation, 4) whether a
lesser modification of the laws would have achieved the same goals, and 5) whether the
new law would have negative consequences. 249 Yet other factors could include
countervailing public policies such as enforcing the “justified expectations” of a
contract, 250 and the lack of foreseeability and notice that may hinder the parties’ freedom
and rights to have a contract with a choice of law clause. 251
¶61
For example, new food safety laws are arguably very compelling and would
probably pass scrutiny under the different factors listed above. A contract that freezes the
interpretation and execution under old food safety laws would probably not be
enforceable. Understandably, new food safety regulations are in the public’s immediate
best interest, because no one wants to be harmed by unsafe foods. As such, food
companies ought to be interested in adopting the latest regulations 252 and might draft a
freezing clause only for other, non-food areas of law. 253 For instance, if there are new
regulations for food packaging rather than food safety, the very same company might
welcome a freezing clause for packaging regulations in order to avoid the extra costs of
retooling for new packages. 254

246
See, e.g., Lufkin v. McCallum, 956 F.2d 1104, 1107 (11th Cir. 1992) (considering whether litigants
actually relied on the old rule and how they would suffer from the retroactive application of the new); VE
Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (regarding the effect of
changes in the venue statutes on two consolidated cases, one which began before the change in statute and
one which began after).
247
United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 (1977).
248
Id. at 22–23; East New York Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233 (1945).
249
United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 28–32.
250
Fresh Cut, Inc. v. Fazli, 650 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (Ind. 1995) (“[T]he factors . . . to be considered in
determining whether a contract not prohibited by statute or clearly tending to injure public but nevertheless
alleged to contravene public policy should be enforced, (i) the nature of the subject matter of contract; (ii)
the strength of the public policy underlying statute; (iii) the likelihood that refusal to enforce the bargain or
term will further that policy; (iv) how serious or deserved would be forfeiture suffered by party attempting
to enforce bargain; and (v) the parties' relative bargaining power and freedom to contract.”).
See also the many factors listed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178, 179 (2010).
251
Under the closely related topic of forum shopping, these are factors that are considered by courts.
See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991).
252
See e.g., Interview with Susan Chao, supra note 74.
253
Id.
254
Id.
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However, regardless of the factors courts will consider in shaping policy, the
threshold needed to invalidate a choice of law provision is high, 255 and this heightened
threshold is expected to carry over to a choice of time of law clause because the rationale
for both provisions is the same. 256
C. Public Policy that Approves a Choice of Time of Law Clause

¶63

In contrast to the foregoing, there is a public policy argument in favor of choice of
law and choice of time of law provisions. The public policy justifying a choice of law
clause emanates from the Contract Clause, 257 the Restatements for contracts and for
conflict of laws, the U.C.C., and even procedural rules such as Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 1—the policy of providing certainty and peace of mind and efficiency afforded
by contract. 258 The same policy should also extend to justifying a choice of time of law
clause as well. Thus, the question really becomes which public policy prevails in any
given case, the policies behind the choice of time of law or some other policy.
¶64
Unlike with food safety, implementing new patent and patent license laws is
arguably not as urgent; therefore, the contract parties should be permitted to adopt and
enforce a choice of time of law provision. 259 For instance, the Supreme Court’s KSR
decision championed the use of “common sense” in determining whether a purported
invention is “obvious.” 260 Subsequently, if a license dispute occurs over the obviousness
(validity) of existing patents issued before the KSR decision, it may not be clear which
way a judicial scale will tip, in favor of patent policy or in favor of a choice of time of
law provision. 261 The new KSR decision may not pass scrutiny under the factors used to
balance policy against contract intent, such as the necessity of the new law or alternative
solutions. Perhaps, the new KSR decision may not be sufficiently compelling to
overcome the policies of the freedom and expectations of contracts. 262 In all likelihood,
certain types of contracts will never permit containing a choice of time of law provision,
such as for food, health care, and transportation safety regulations. On the other hand,
patent licensing could permit a choice of time of law, including freezing clauses, because
patents are rarely so essential and life-sustaining, like food or health. 263
255

See the beginning of this Section. See also BRUNSVOLD, supra note 182, at 268.
See Section II.C and the beginning of Section IV.
257
Curtis, supra note 159, at 336 n.98 (arguing why the Contract Clause supports U.S. government
upholding stabilization) (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts’); Trustees. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); United States
Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)).
258
FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (The Rules “should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”). See also supra Sections III.B and V.
259
See Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 233–34 (1892) (regarding policies related to a patent
contract).
260
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
261
See Papastavros, supra note 65, at 8.
262
It is debatable whether the new “test” under KSR is better or worse than the old test. The policy
behind KSR is to deny patents to trivial inventions and to move away from the previous, more rigid TSM
test. On the other hand, a “common sense” test is nebulous and subjective because different people have a
different sense of what is “common” when it comes to inventions. By contrast, the TSM test was rigorous
and objective, which has merits as well. See generally Lester Horwitz, Horwitz on Some Strategies on the
Question of Obviousness, 2008 Emerging Issues 792 (2007) (LexisNexis).
263
Patents are not necessarily essential. Patents and patent licenses are largely vehicles for economic
transactions. When one party benefits, the other party loses, and vice versa. There is little moral right or
256
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D. A Test to Determine Whether a Choice of Time of Law Clause is Valid
¶65

If there are public policy concerns in a particular case surrounding a choice of time
of law provision, this paper proposes a test to help courts determine whether a choice of
time of law clause should be valid and enforceable. The proposed test (“Test”) consists
of verifying whether the clause could have been drafted in alternative language at the
time of contract execution and whether the contract would still be valid under the new
law and not in violation of public policy. That is, the Test would ask if there is a legally
valid alternative. A party trying to enforce the clause would have the burden of
proposing the substitute language in the event of litigation. Then, the court shall decide
whether the substitute language is valid as a matter of law.
¶66
For instance, suppose A and B entered into a football gambling contract a year ago
with a provision selecting “Texas law existing on the date of contract execution.” 264
Further suppose, Texas abolishes gambling as being against public policy; then, the
question is whether the choice of time of law clause is still valid. Applying the Test, a
court would decide whether the clause could have been alternatively drafted at the time
when the contract was executed. The party arguing for the validity of the choice of time
of law clause should attempt to find alternative language that would not violate public
policy. For example, suppose the party substitutes the phrase “Nevada law” for “Texas
law.” Also suppose that the parties could indeed have selected Nevada law and gambling
was and still is permitted in Nevada. Under these circumstances, a court should find the
choice of time clause to be valid and enforceable. The rationale is that there is an
alternative that was or is legally acceptable under the original language of “Texas law
existing at the time of contract execution.” The existence of a legitimate alternative
means that the original contract language would still be acceptable under some aspect of
Texas public policy.
¶67
As another example, which parallels an actual case, 265 suppose publishing house P
entered into a contract with author A to pay for his copyrighted material, relying on a
phrase “copyright law existing on the date of contract execution” clause. Then, suppose
the United States extended the copyright term for the public policy reason of harmonizing
with that of other countries’ copyright laws. Suppose A wants to be paid for the
additional years under the new law in effect. But, consider if P can show there was no
intent or perhaps no purpose in paying for any extra years (e.g. because the book would
no longer be topical). P could have originally drafted alternate language such as “pay for
A’s material for ten years,” which did and does not violate public policy and is obviously

wrong, let alone health or safety issues. Although some argue that patents encourage inventions and the
spread of knowledge, other areas advance rapidly and openly without the need for patents. Math and
science principles by themselves are not patentable and yet they flourish. Scientists publish openly and
share their discoveries and science has advanced in leaps and bounds. See generally Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 71–2 (1972) (holding one may not patent an idea that has no substantial practical application);
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive
right.”).
As further evidence that patents are not essentials, there is open (i.e. unpatented and free) software.
Wikipedia has also thrived in advancing knowledge, freely. See WIKIPEDIA, http://www.wikipedia.org/
(last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
264
This question was provided by Professor Adam Todd, Southern Methodist University, Spring 2010.
265
BJM, Inc. v. Melport Corp., 18 F. Supp. 2d 704 (W.D. Ky. 1998).
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a legitimate, legally acceptable condition. Accordingly, a court should find the choice of
time of law provision valid and enforceable.
¶68
On the other hand, the food safety laws offer a contrary example. Suppose parties
S (seller) and B (buyer) contracted for hotdogs with a provision “food laws existing on
the date of contract execution.” Suppose a dye in the hotdogs causes cancer and a new
food law permits only a different dye in hotdogs. If S does not want to pay extra for the
more expensive dye then S can either use no dye (but then, the hotdog looks unpalatable
and unmarketable) or use the more expensive dye. S should not be allowed to rely on the
original contract clause to revert to the old food regulation because his dye causes cancer,
which clearly violates public interest. Had the harm been discovered earlier,
theoretically, the regulation would have already been in existence at the time of contract
execution. Under these circumstances, the court should hold the choice of time of law
clause invalid because it violates an essential public interest, and S must follow the new
law. In this scenario, S should have negotiated a contract with a hybrid clause instead of
a freezing clause in order to mitigate his risk allocation. S could have contracted to share
any increased costs due to new regulations. Regardless, by utilizing the Test, courts have
discretion to decide whether a choice of time of law provision should be enforceable.
¶69
As a final note, there are other justifications for the Test. For instance, it is
consistent with Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(1) and general contract
interpretation. In fact, the plain meaning of § 187(1) suggests the Test. 266 “The [time of]
law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be
applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit
provision in their agreement directed to that issue.” 267 The words “time of” have been
inserted by the author to argue for a choice of time of law. Notice how easily a new
provision could be added to the Restatement to implement this paper’s proposed solution.
VI. WHAT IS SPECIAL (AKA “DIFFICULT”) ABOUT PATENT LICENSING?
¶70

Patent licenses are one type of contract. Not taking into account legal costs, in
1994, U.S. patent licensing generated at least $33 billion in revenue per year; in 2002, the
figure grew to about $68 billion 268 and over $100 billion in 2005. 269 Revenue is expected
to continue to increase because the number of patents granted per year more than doubled
since 2002. 270 Commentators indicate that patent licenses particularly need to include a
choice of law clause. 271 Considering all the legal changes in patent law over the last three
or four years, this paper contends that the licenses also need a choice of time of law
266

See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 180, at 225 (summarizing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187, cmt. c).
267
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) (1971) (emphasis added).
268
RUSSELL PARR, ROYALTY RATES FOR LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 18 (2007) (The
companies with the largest U.S. patent portfolios are IBM, GE, Canon, Hitachi, Toshiba, NEC, Kodak,
Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Sony, Motorola, Siemens, Philips, AT&T, and the U.S. Navy.).
269
See Licensing Royalty Revenues, INVENTION STATISTICS,
http://www.inventionstatistics.com/Licensing_Royalty_Revenues.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
270
See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov (last visited Apr. 18,
2011); Number of New Patents Issued, INVENTION STATISTICS,
http://www.inventionstatistics.com/Number_of_New_Patents_Issued.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
271
See generally NIMMER & DODD, supra note 139, § 2:57 (“In part because of the confusing and
uncertain background law, most licenses specify what law governs disputes relating to a license”).
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provision. 272 Moreover, there are many different areas of laws that could conceivably
change and impinge on patent licenses over the lifetime of a license.
¶71
Patents themselves are governed by federal statutes and common law created
mostly by the U.S. Supreme Court and the CAFC. 273 However, the licenses themselves
are contracts, and state contract law should apply to the contract aspects of the licenses. 274
But, occasionally, the courts will apply federal patent license law created by federal
courts. 275 Also, patent license litigation is sometimes conducted in state courts, 276 but
more often it is conducted in federal courts, because patents are a constitutional matter.277
But, if a case is appealed to the CAFC, the court may apply its own laws or may apply
other federal circuit law (e.g. Fifth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, etc.). 278 Also, given the amount
of forum shopping in patent litigation, 279 the effect of different local rules and particular
judge-made rules becomes more of an issue. Finally, federal patent statutes, common
law, and a very large body of U.S. Patent Office administrative 280 law could also apply to
the patent licenses. Given this myriad of laws, patent licensing parties may do well to
track down as much certainty as possible by including a choice of time of law provision.
Otherwise, because there are so many different governing laws, some regulation is bound
to change and disturb the parties’ intended agreement. For example, the agreement might
include the following provision in bold face type 281 and perhaps exclude the local conflict
of law rules because of the divergence among the different local rules.282
Governing Law.
This Agreement shall be deemed to have been entered into and shall be
interpreted and governed in all respects by the judicial and legislative laws of the
State of Texas and the United States of America, existing at the time of execution
of this Agreement, without giving effect to their conflict of laws rules.
272

KSR, Bilski, Quanta Computer, and Transcore are only a sample of the major patent or patent
licensing cases decided by the Supreme Court or the CAFC in the last three years.
273
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . .
.”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under
this Constitution . . . .”).
274
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“Commercial agreements traditionally
are the domain of state law. State law is not displaced merely because the contract relates to intellectual
property . . . .”). See also U.C.C. § 1-103, comment 3 (2009).
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CONCLUSION

¶72

Our laws are not frozen into immutable form like insects trapped in Devonian
amber, but instead are constantly undergoing revision. There are bound to be changes in
laws that are not welcomed by contracting parties. Such a scenario is particularly ironic
for parties to a contract because the changes may defeat the very purpose of preserving a
binding agreement in writing. In the U.S., there should be a proactive solution of
supplementing the traditional choice of territorial law through a choice of time of law
clause to safeguard against detrimental new legislation, regulations, and common law. 283
Importantly, a choice of time of law provision can be consistent with constitutional law,
state contract law, and the rules on conflict of laws. Should public policy concerns arise
against such a provision, this paper proposed the Test to help courts weigh which policy
should prevail—the policy of upholding the intent of the parties by a contract or some
other policy interests.
¶73
As for practical matters, a choice of time of law clause is a useful tool that domestic
contracting parties may implement to ease their minds, gain more certainty, draft
workarounds to disadvantageous law, and reduce litigation. Such a tool is particularly
useful in constantly evolving areas such as patent law. Initially, it might be difficult to
introduce the concept to the U.S. courts, but the tool has been used in international
contracts and adjudicated in international courts, both of which can serve as practicable
examples. Additionally, there have even been a few U.S. cases where a contract party
selected future legislative law and the courts did not disapprove of the practice. As such,
it is certainly plausible to continue and then popularize the practice. When courts try to
decide whether to enforce a choice of time of law clause, they may apply the Test, which
requires the proponent of the clause to provide substitute language for the matter at issue,
which the party could have drafted into the original contract but did not do so because the
party relied on its selection clause instead. If the substitute language creates a contract
that does not violate public policy, then the choice of time of law clause should be
deemed acceptable in that instance. In summary, domestic parties should be free to
include and try to enforce a choice of time of law clause in their contracts because there
are few theoretical and practical obstacles to implementing such a useful tool.

283

One commentator believes that the ex post facto clause in the Constitution applies also to the
common law. Robert H. Hughes, That Was Then, But That's What Counts: Freezing the Law of R.S. 2477,
2002 UTAH L. REV. 679, 696–97 (2002) (citing Shell Oil Co. v. M/T GILDA, 790 F.2d 1209, 1213 (5th
Cir. 1986) (“In general, parties intending to be bound by a statute intend to be bound by the body of judicial
decisions interpreting and applying the statute.”); Saint Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Rutland, 225 F.2d 689,
692 (5th Cir. 1955)). However, the role of “interpreting” the legislative law often leads to new common
law. This is also true where there is only common law in existence and no legislation. Also, there are
many cases where the opinion states that judicial decisions may take retroactive effect.
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